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Completing Government Speech’s Unfinished
Business: Clipping Garcetti’s Wings and
Addressing Scholarship and Teaching
by EDWARD J. SCHOEN∗

Introduction
1

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court held that “when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”2 In
making this decision, the Court stated government speech trumps
government employee speech whenever the employee’s expression “owes
its existence to [the] employee’s professional responsibilities,”3 and is
created pursuant to the duties the employee is actually expected to
perform.4
The language quoted above has triggered a surge of circuit court
decisions dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 employment retaliation claims,
because the courts usually determined the expression was derived from the
government employees’ actual duties. The U.S. Supreme Court recently

∗ J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University,
Glassboro, New Jersey.
1. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
2. Id. at 421.
3. Id. at 421–22.
4. Id. at 424–25. In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2239 (2015), the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the role of government speech to cover
specialty license plates issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). The Sons
of Confederate Veterans asked the DMV to issue a specialty plate featuring the Confederate battle
flag. When DMV refused to approve the specialty plate, the Sons of Confederate Veterans sued,
claiming its First Amendment rights had been violated. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
specialty license plates are a form of government speech, because, in approving specialty plates,
the state is engaging in expressive conduct, and, when the government speaks, “it is not barred by
the Free Speech Clause from determining the contend of what it says.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at
2246; David L. Hudson, Jr., October 2014 Term: First Amendment Review, 42 A.B.A. PREVIEW
282, 282 (2015).
[537]
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addressed this issue in Lane v. Franks,5 and decided that a government
employee’s expression is not automatically protected government worker
speech simply because the government employee acquired the information
through the course of public employment. Rather, the speech at issue must
ordinarily be made within the scope of the employee’s duties to fall under
the umbrella of government worker speech.6
Garcetti triggered a second development by disclaiming whether
government speech applies “in the same manner to a case involving speech
related to scholarship or teaching.”7
This disclaimer has created
inconsistency and doubt in assessing § 1983 public worker employment
retaliation claims pursued by faculty members at public colleges and
universities.
The purpose of this article is to assess the status of these two
developments. Part I of this article examines the evolution of the
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test for determining whether government
worker speech is protected by the First Amendment. Part II of this article
examines multiple circuit court decisions following the Garcetti application
to § 1983 government worker employment retaliation claims, and
demonstrates that, if the U.S. Supreme Court’s purpose in deciding
Garcetti was the elimination of § 1983 government worker employment
retaliation claims, it has been wildly successful. Part III of this article
examines the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lane, and subsequent
appellate decisions, to determine how Lane’s qualifications of Garcetti are
playing out. Part IV of this Article examines several appellate court cases
dealing with § 1983 government worker employment retaliation claims
pursued by public college and university professors to determine whether
academic freedom in teaching and research plays a role in providing First
Amendment protection of speech following the Garcetti disclaimer.

I. Evolution of the Pickering/Connick/Ceballos Test
Almost fifty years ago in a landmark decision, Pickering v. Board of
Education,8 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment
provides limited protection of government workers’ expression. Marvin
Pickering, a high school teacher, wrote a letter criticizing the school
board’s allocation of funds between academic and athletic programs. The
letter was published in a local newspaper in the middle of a campaign by
the school board to gain voter approval of a tax increase, and the school

5.
6.
7.
8.

Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
Id. at 2379.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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board fired Pickering in retaliation.9 The U.S. Supreme Court noted that
the government funding of education is a matter of public concern, that
teachers, as members of the community, have informed opinions on how
school funds should be spent and should be able to speak freely on such
questions without fear of retaliation, and that teachers’ expression on
matters of public concern must be given First Amendment protection, even
if it contains factual errors.10 In deciding that the school board’s decision
to terminate Pickering’s employment violated his First Amendment rights,
the U.S. Supreme Court balanced “the interests of the teacher, as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.”11 Because Pickering’s letter did not
disrupt the harmony of his workplace or affect the delivery of educational
services, because Pickering did not have a close working relationship with
either school board members or the superintendent at whom his criticisms
were directed, and because Pickering’s letter addressed and informed a
matter of public concern best resolved through open debate, his dismissal
from public employment violated the First Amendment.12 In short, “to the
extent the employee’s speech contributes to debate about issues of public
concern without negatively impacting the government workplace or
operations, it should be permitted; in contrast, to the extent the employee’s
speech interferes with efficient delivery of public services by the
government agency or department and fails to contribute to public debate
about issues of public concern, it can be restrained.”13
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court modified the Pickering balancing
test in Connick v. Meyers.14 Advised she would be transferred to a
different section of criminal court, Assistant District Attorney Sheila Myers
distributed a questionnaire to fifteen other assistant district attorneys
seeking their views about the transfer policy, office morale, grievance
procedures, confidence in superiors, and pressure to work in political
campaigns. District Attorney Harry Connick learned of the survey and
fired Myers. Myers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,15 contending her
9. Id. at 564.
10. Id. at 571–72, 574–75.
11. Id. at 568.
12. Id. at 569–70, 572–74.
13. Edward J. Schoen and Joseph S. Falchek, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Government Workers,
Whistleblowing, and the First Amendment—Let the Leaks Begin, 17 S. LAW J. 131, 135 (2007).
14. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1968).
15. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
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employment was terminated in retaliation for her exercising her First
Amendment rights.16 In applying the Pickering balancing test, the U.S.
Supreme Court declared that the court must preliminarily determine
whether or not the government worker’s expression addressed a matter of
public concern by examining the expression’s content, form and context.17
The Court decided that, with one exception, Myers’ inquiries were
designed to fuel her dispute with her superiors, which was an internal
personnel matter without public interest. Because one aspect of Myers’
questionnaire—pressure to work on political campaigns—addressed a
matter of public concern, the district attorney was required to justify the
termination of Myers’ employment so that the Court could balance the First
Amendment value of the expression and its impact on the delivery of
government services.18 The Court then easily concluded that Myers’
expression had little value as a matter of public concern and that its limited
value was overwhelmingly outweighed by the survey’s negative effects:
disrupting office operations, undermining the district attorney’s authority,
and straining office working relationships. Hence Connick’s firing of
Myers did not violate the First Amendment.19
Over the next two decades, the Pickering/Connick test—determining
whether the worker’s expression addressed a matter of public concern and,
if so, weighing the First Amendment value of the public employee’s
expression as a citizen and the interest of the government to promote
efficiency in delivery of public services—prevailed in ascertaining whether
negative employment actions by employers in retaliation for the public
employees’ expression violated the First Amendment.20 That balancing
test, however, would be undermined in 2006 by the U.S. Supreme court
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.21

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (R.S. § 1979; Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, Dec. 29, 1979,
93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. No. 104-317, Title III, § 309(c), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.).
16. Myers, 461 U.S. at 141.
17. Id. at 146–47.
18. Id. at 150.
19. Id. at 154.
20. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1987);
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality
opinion); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam); and Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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In Garcetti, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”22
Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for Los Angeles County,
concerned about the accuracy of an affidavit used to obtain a search
warrant, recommended to his superiors that a case assigned to him be
dismissed and, when called as a witness by defense counsel, recounted his
observations about the affidavit at a hearing on a motion to traverse.23 The
trial court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the warrant, and Ceballos
was demoted from calendar deputy to trial deputy, transferred to another
courthouse, and denied a promotion. Claiming these actions were
retaliatory, Ceballos pursued a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation
of his First Amendment rights.24
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Ceballos’ claim, concluding “the
First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an
employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”25 The
Court emphasized two factors: Ceballos prepared his memoranda
recommending the dismissal of the case as part of his official duties as a
calendar deputy, and in carrying out his professional duties, Ceballos was
acting as a government employee, not a citizen.26 In rejecting Ceballos’
claim, the Court insisted that government employers must have discretion
to manage their operations and are entitled to control government employee
speech made in their professional capacity in order to insure that “official
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote
the employer’s mission.”27 Providing First Amendment protection of
government employees’ speech made in their professional capacity “would

22. Id. at 421.
23. Id. at 415. A motion to traverse is employed to attack the truth of the information
contained in the warrant affidavit. The burden of proof imposed on the defendant in such a
motion is steep. “Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by
the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding
of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s
request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false
material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable
cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent
as if probably cause was lacking on the fact of the affidavit.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
155–56 (1978).
24. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
25. Id. at 424.
26. Id. at 421–22.
27. Id.
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commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role,
mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among
government employees and their supervisors in the course of official
business” and “demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of
federalism and the separation of powers.”28 Indeed, the Court noted,
“[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created.”29
Two major issues emerged from Garcetti. First, in deciding
government speech trumps government employee speech whenever the
employee’s expression “owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional
responsibilities”30 and is created pursuant “to the duties the employee is
actually expected to perform,”31 the U.S. Supreme Court triggered a torrent
of circuit court decisions dismissing § 1983 employment retaliation claims
because the courts usually determined the expression was derived from the
government employees’ actual duties.
These decisions effectively
eviscerate the Pickering/Connick protection of any government employee
speech whenever the expression is related to their employment
responsibilities,32 a matter the U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed in
Lane v. Franks,33 which is discussed more fully below in Part III. Second,
the Court disclaimed whether the Garcetti analysis applied “in the same
manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”34
This disclaimer has created inconsistency and doubt in assessing § 1983
public worker employment retaliation claims in college and university
settings.

28. Id. at 423.
29. Id. at 421–22.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 424–25.
32. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The First Amendment Rights of Government Employees
Subpoenaed to Testify About Information Learned on the Job, 41 ABA PREVIEW 298, 299 (2014)
(“[T]he Garcetti court stated that government employees have no First Amendment rights with
respect to speech ‘that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.’
Some courts and scholars have relied on this language to argue that employees have no First
Amendment right to repeat information they learned only about a result of their job duties.”).
33. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
34. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
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II. Section 1983 Public Worker Employment Retaliation Claims
after Garcetti
If the U.S. Supreme Court’s purpose in deciding Garcetti was a sharp
diminution of § 1983 government worker employment retaliation claims, it
has been wildly successful. Most circuit court decisions have dismissed
those claims on the grounds that the expression was employee speech, not
citizen speech. A sampling of those decisions follows.
A. First Circuit

In Foley v. Town of Randolph,35 the Chief of the Fire Department in
Randolph, Massachusetts, expressed his concern about inadequate funding
and staffing of the Randolph fire department in a press conference at the
scene of a fatal fire, one in which two children were trapped in a second
story bedroom and died. He asked the reporters to bring this matter to the
attention of the public. He also confronted James Burgess and spoke to
Maureen Kenney, Randolph Selectmen, about the manpower cuts in the
fire department. Subsequently, the department brought disciplinary
charges against Foley, and the hearing officer concluded that Foley
inappropriately initiated physical contact with Burgess and made
intemperate and misleading statements to the media during the press
conference. The officer also recommended a fifteen-day suspension
without pay. The Randolph Board of Selectmen approved the report and
Foley’s suspension. The court noted that Foley’s job performance criteria
included effective interaction with the media, and Foley had conducted at
least one other press conference, responded to media inquiries, and made
comments to the media as part of his employment duties.36 The Court
concluded that Foley had addressed the media in his official capacity as
Fire Chief while on duty in uniform at the fire scene. While his comments
were directed to the public, the circumstances in which they were made
caused them to appear to be official communications which related entirely
to Fire Department matters. Hence, Foley was speaking as an employee,
not a citizen, and was not entitled First Amendment protection.37
35. Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
36. Id. at 3–4.
37. Id. at 8–9. Accord Alberti v. Carlo-Izquierdo, 548 F. App’x 625, 638–39 (1st Cir. 2013)
(University of Puerto Rico nurse practitioner’s complaint about her student’s violation of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act to the Chancellor of the University’s Medical
Science Campus was expression as a government employee, not a private citizen, and her
termination as a tenure track associate professor of nursing did not violate the First Amendment);
Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 39–43 (1st Cir. 2007) (a corrections officer employed by the
Essex County Sheriffs Department posted two rambling messages to the union discussion board;
the first employed an analogy to Nazi slaughter of Jews and the disciplinary actions taken against
the corrections officer, and threatened aggressive action to protect the officers; the second
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Second Circuit

Jackler v. Byrne38 is one of the circuit court decisions giving a
government worker First Amendment protection against retaliatory
employment actions. Jason Jackler, a probationary police officer with the
Middletown, New York police department, filed a report accusing another
police officer, Gregory Metakes, of punching Zachary Jones in the face
after he had been arrested, handcuffed and placed in the back seat of a
police car, contrary to a written policy prohibiting the use of unjustified
force. The police chief, Matthew Byrne, and two other police lieutenants,
Paul Rickard and Patrick Freeman, attempted to convince Jackler to replace
his report with a new one exonerating Metakes. Jackler refused to alter his
report and was terminated as a probationary officer upon the
recommendation of the Police Chief and Freeman’s doctored performance
evaluation of Jackler. The court noted that citizens have the right, and
sometimes the duty, to provide truthful reports on criminal conduct and can
extended the Nazi analogy, complained that disciplinary actions were unfairly taken against
department employees, and urged department administrators to oppose those actions; in response
to these postings, the Department conducted a disciplinary hearing, after which the Sheriff
terminated Curran’s employment; Curran pursued a § 1983 action, contending he was fired for
exercising his First Amendment rights; the district court granted the defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, concluding the disruption caused by Currans’ posts outweighed their
value as expression; the First Circuit affirmed, concluding that, while Curran’s messages raised
the issue of political favoritism in making personnel decisions, which was a matter of public
concern, the messages urged insubordination, insulted the integrity of department administrators,
and posed a substantial risk of disrupting department operations, impairing discipline by
superiors, creating disharmony and friction in working relationships, and undermining confidence
in administrators; hence, the potential damage caused by the postings outweighed their limited
First Amendment value); and Foote v. Town of Bedford, 642 F.3d 80, 81–82, 85 (1st Cir. 2011)
(when his membership on the Bedford Recreation Commission (“BRD”), an unpaid, advisory
body charged with making recommendations on recreational facilities, was not renewed, William
Foote claimed his nonrenewal was retaliation for his opposition to a proposed project and
advocacy of use impact fees to fund the project; Foote pursued § 1983 claim against the Town of
Bedford and four members of the Bedford Town Council who voted to deny his appointment; the
federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, and the First Circuit
affirmed, ruling that Foote’s role on BRD, albeit as an unpaid volunteer, was to make
recommendations on policy matters, and hence his speech emanated from and was part of his
duties as a member of the Commission and was not protected by the First Amendment). See
Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2011) (Ellen Decotiis, who provided speech
and language therapy and evaluation services under contracts with various regional child
development services (“CDS”) sites, encouraged the parents of the children she was treating in
the CDS-Cumberland to contact advocacy groups to challenge an arbitrary reduction in speech
and language services to their children; CDS-Cumberland thereafter informed Decotiis that her
contract would not be renewed, and Decotiis pursued a § 1983 action against CDS-Cumberland
and its director; the district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
the First Circuit reversed, ruling the pleadings provided little or no information about the
circumstances, location, timing, source of information and context of her communications to the
parents, and hence could not determine whether or not it occurred within the scope of her
contractual duties).
38. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011).
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be punished for submitting false reports, and that use of excessive force by
police officers is a matter of public concern.39 Crucially, the court also
determined that Jackler’s speech had a clear civilian counterpart in that
private citizens who file complaints of police brutality are protected under
the First Amendment against threats from police to withdraw their truthful
reports and submit false statements.40 Hence, even though Jackler
submitted his report as part of his official duties, his refusal to alter that
report has a “clear civilian analogue,” giving Jackler a First Amendment
right to refuse to retract a truthful report and replace it with false report.41
C. Third Circuit

In Reilly v. City of Atlantic City,42 Robert Reilly, an Atlantic City
police officer in the vice and intelligence units, was charged with engaging
in sexual harassment of a subordinate. The hearing officer found that
Reilly had engaged in such conduct but that his conduct was mitigated by
surrounding circumstances and that Reilly should be suspended for four
days without pay, rather than dismissed or reduced in rank. Unhappy with
the hearing officer’s recommendation, Robert Flipping, the Director of
39. Id. at 241.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 241–42. Contra Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 186–89 (2d Cir.
2008) (Angelo Ruotolo, a retired police officer who prepared a report in his capacity of Safety
Officer claiming contamination from underground gasoline storage tanks threatened the health of
residents in the area, including police officers and employees in his precinct, claimed he suffered
ongoing retaliation in response to his report; two weeks prior to the scheduled trial on his
complaint, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garcetti, and defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint; the district court dismissed Ruotolo’s complaint because he prepared the report as part
of his official duties; the Second Circuit affirmed, ruling the subject matter of the report was not a
matter of public concern and Ruotola’s lawsuit sought to redress personal grievances rather than
to advance a public purpose). Cf. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Bd. of the City of N.Y.,
593 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2010) (David Weintraub, a public school elementary teacher, pursued
a § 1983 claim against school officials for taking retaliatory employment actions against him,
because he filed a grievance complaining about the school administration’s refusal to discipline a
student who threw a book at him during class; the Court ruled Weintraub was not protected by the
First Amendment, because there was no civilian analogue to a union grievance, and he voiced his
grievance through internal dispute resolution channels in his capacity as a teacher, rather than as a
citizen). See Ezuma v. City University of New York, 367 F. App’x 178, 180 (2d Cir. 2010)
(faculty member’s expressed dissatisfaction with selection of a department chair who lacked the
doctorate was a matter of concern within the academic community and not the public at large, did
not pertain to a matter of public concern, and was not protected by the First Amendment). See
also Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 464 F.3d 217, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2006) (denial of
emeritus status to Martin Zelnik, a retired professor in the Interior Design Department, as
retaliation for his opposition to the partial closing of a street on which the professor and his
partner owned a building in which they conducted their architecture and interior design practice,
was not a violation of Zelnik’s First Amendment rights, because emeritus status is merely
honorific and carries little or no value, and its denial does not constitute adverse employment
action).
42. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 219, 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Public Safety, engaged in a smear campaign against Reilly, and advocated
he be suspended for ninety days and demoted in rank from sergeant to
patrolman. Flipping then approached Reilly’s attorney and offered to have
Reilly retire immediately at the rank of sergeant. After brief negotiations,
Reilly signed a consent agreement implementing his retirement and giving
him his pension and a lump sum payment. Reilly then pursued § 1983
action for employment retaliation, claiming that Flipping was seeking
revenge for Reilly’s prior trial testimony provided as part of police
corruption investigations on Flipping. The district court denied Flipping’s
motion for summary judgment.43 The district court’s decision preceded the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti, and Flipping appealed to the
Third Circuit contending Garcetti provided him with qualified immunity
against Reilly’s claim as a matter of law.44 The Third Circuit concluded
Reilly’s trial testimony was sufficiently developed in the appeal record to
permit the court to consider whether Reilly’s sworn trial testimony was
provided pursuant to his official duties as a matter of law.45 The Third
Circuit Court affirmed the district court, reasoning that every citizen owes a
duty to society to provide testimony aiding the enforcement of the law, and
held that a government employee who so testifies does so as a citizen and a
government employee, and therefore is protected by the First
Amendment.46
43. Id. at 219–27.
44. Id. at 225–27.
45. Id. at 227–28.
46. Id. at 232. Contra Kimmett v. Corbett, 554 F. App’x 106, 107–10, 112–13 (3d Cir.
2014) (Thomas Kimmett, the supervisor of the Administrative Collections Unit in the Financial
Enforcement Section (“FES”) of the Office of Attorney General (“OAG”), discovered
mismanagement and improprieties in the FES and the Department of Revenue (“DOR”), with
which he worked to collect outstanding debts owed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
Kimmett reported these problems both up and outside his chain of command; when he was not
selected for position of Chief of FES and was removed from a large software project he had
headed, Kimmett filed a federal complaint alleging retaliation for his complaints of wrongdoing
in the collection process; Kimmel’s second annual evaluation criticized his job performance and
provided a remedial plan for improvement; Kimmett strenuously objected to the evaluation and
remedial plan, causing his superiors to conclude that he was unwilling to accept supervision and
improve his performance, and to terminate his employment; Kimmett amended his complaint to
include these actions as additional retaliatory employment actions; following discovery, the
district court concluded that, while parts of Kimmett’s of speech were made as a citizen and
addressed matters of public concern, the OAG’s interest in workplace harmony outweighed the
value of that speech, and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment; the Third Circuit
affirmed, ruling (1) Kimmett’s disclosures of improprieties in the collection process related, and
were made pursuant, to his employment duties, and (2) Kimmett’s employment retaliation
lawsuit, while addressing a matter of public concern, created significant disruption in the OAG,
impaired the ability his superiors to supervise his work, and detrimentally affected working
relationships which required personal trust and confidence); Kocher v. Larksville Borough, 548
F. App’x 813, 815–18 (3d Cir. 2013) (when his investigation disclosed that allegations in a parttime patrolman’s incident report, which described the patrolman’s encounter with the Borough
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D. Fourth Circuit

In Lee v. York County School Division,47 William Lee, a Spanish
teacher at Tabb High School in Yorktown, Virginia, posted religious
materials on the bulletin boards of his classroom. A private citizen
complained about the materials to the School Board, which asked Crispin
Zanca, the high school principal, to investigate. Zanca went to Lee’s
classroom to discuss the matter. Lee was absent from school that day, and
Zanca examined the materials, determined they were inappropriate, and
removed them. Lee’s subsequent request to repost the materials was
denied by the superintendent following an investigation by the Board’s
attorney. Lee then pursued a § 1983 claim against the school board and
superintendent.48 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the school board, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the posted
materials were curricular in nature and did not constitute speech concerning
a public matter.49 Further, the court noted, public schools have the right to
regulate speech occurring in a compulsory classroom setting to insure
educational objectives are achieved, thereby disqualifying it as speech on
matters of public concern.50 Since the posted materials were curricular in
nature, they did not qualify for First Amendment protection, and the
dispute over their removal was “nothing more than an ordinary
employment dispute.”51
mayor, were false, the Police Chief recommended the patrolman be fired; the Borough Council
terminated the patrolman’s employment, and the patrolman pursued a § 1983 retaliatory
employment claim, alleging he lost his job because he complained about the mayor’s conduct; the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Third Circuit
affirmed, ruling the patrolman’s incident report was written while he was on duty, in response to
his supervisors’ suggestions, and on the official incident report form, and was posted to a
password-protected police department computer, and hence was made pursuant to his official
duties); and Taylor v. Pawlowski, 551 F. App’x 31–32 (3d Cir. 2013) (state police officer’s
objections to the institution of an “illegal quota system for traffic stops” made to superior officers,
the Commissioner of the State Police, and Internal Affairs were made through his chain of
command, were required by the State Police field regulations, and were part of his responsibilities
as a public employee). See also Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 242–43 (3d Cir. 2007),
abrogated on other grounds by Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (police
officers’ statements concerning hazardous conditions at a firing range were not protected by the
First Amendment, because they were made within their official duties since they were obligated
to report that type of information up the chain of command), and Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d
179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009), discussed more fully infra in Part IV.
47. Lee v. York Cty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d. 687 (4th Cir. 2007).
48. Id. at 689–92.
49. Id. at 694.
50. Id. at 695–98.
51. Id. at 700. Accord Brooks v. Arthur, 685 F.3d 367, 369–70, 372–75 (4th Cir. 2012)
(James Brooks and Donald Hamlette were employed as corrections officers at the Rustburg
Correctional Unit in Rustburg, Virginia; Brooks discussed the possibility of pursuing employment
discrimination claims with his superiors, and Hamlette filed a discrimination complaint
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Fifth Circuit

identifying Brooks as a potential witness; on the day before the witness responses were due, the
prison superintendent issued employment termination notices to Brooks and Hamlette; Brooks
and Hamlette challenged their terminations, and the Virginia Department of Employment limited
their punishments to ten-day suspensions, reinstated their employment, and awarded them back
pay; Brooks and Hamlette then pursued § 1983 actions; the district court concluded Brooks and
Hamlette failed to demonstrate their speech addressed a matter of public concern, and granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling (1) that Brooks’
and Hamlette’s discrimination complaints dealt with purely personal grievances, were not a
matter of public concern, and were pursued exclusively through internal grievance procedures,
and (2) that Brooks’ additional claim he was disciplined because he agreed to be a witness in
Hamlett’s claim was without merit, because Hamlett’s claim solely addressed personal grievances
and Brooks’ involvement in that complaint does not give rise to a First Amendment claim); and
Shenoy v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, 521 F. App’x 168, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2013)
(M. Vittal Shenoy and his partner operated Medical Laboratory Consultants of Charlotte
(“MLCC”) to provide pathology services to Carolinas Healthcare Systems (“CHS”) at its two
campuses in Charlotte and Pineville; seeking to consolidate its pathology services, CHS issued a
request for proposals, and MLCC and another competitor, Carolinas Pathology Group (“CPG”)
responded; CHS chose CPG for the pathology contract and CPG ultimately offered employment
to Shenoy to provide the pathology services at Pineville; Shenoy accepted employment with CPG
and became chairman of the hospital’s peer review committees, a voluntary assignment without
compensation, to review incidents of patient death or injury from medical care; in that role,
Shenoy became increasingly critical of CHM-Pineville’s standard of care, as a consequence of
which CHM prevailed upon CPG to terminate Shenov’s employment; Shenoy instituted a § 1983
claim against CHS and CPG for First Amendment retaliation; the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of CHE and CPG; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling Shenoy’s statements
during the peer review committee’s deliberations were not made in public, were made within the
chain of command, and were undertaken as part of his employment duties). Accord Borough of
Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2501 (2011) (“petition filed with an employer using an
internal grievance procedure in many cases will not seek to communicate to the public or to
advance a political or social point of view beyond the employment context” and, while “the
public may always be interested in how government officers are performing their duties . . . that
will not always suffice to show a matter of public concern.”) Contra Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d
302, 305–07 (4th Cir. 2014) (during his political campaign for district judge of Mecklenburg
County, assistant district attorney Sean Smith criticized a defensive-driving course offered to
ticketed drivers, which reduced the number of cases handled by the district attorney’s office;
Peter Gilchrist, the district attorney, discussed the matter with Smith who reiterated his objection
to the program; the following day, Gilchrist fired Smith as assistant district attorney; Smith filed a
§ 1983 action, claiming his employment as district attorney was terminated because of his
criticism of the defensive-driving course as part of his political campaign; the record established
Smith’s duties as assistant district attorney had nothing to do with traffic court, and Gilchrist
conceded Smith was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern and Smith’s speech
outweighed the government’s interest in deliver of public services; the district court granted
Gilchrist’s motion for summary judgment, concluding Gilchrist was entitled to qualified
immunity, because Gilchrist could reasonably have concluded Gilchrist’s interest as an employer
in suppressing Smith’s speech outweighed Smith’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of
public concern; the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling there was no evidence whatsoever indicating
Smith’s speech negatively impacted the efficiency and operations of the district attorney’s office;
hence, a reasonable district attorney “in Gilchrist’s position would have known he could not fire
an assistant district attorney running for public office for speaking publicly in his capacity as a
candidate on matters of public concern”). See also Adams v. University of North CarolinaWilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011), discussed below in Part IV.

Spring 2016]

GOVERNMENT SPEECH’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS

549

In Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,52 Gregory
Williams, the Athletic Director and Head Football coach at Pinkston High
School in Dallas, Texas, wrote a series of memoranda addressed to the
school office manager, and copied to the school principal, requesting
information on the school’s athletic account. After receiving no response,
Williams sent a memorandum to the school principal objecting to the
reallocation of gate receipts from athletic events to other sports programs.
Four days later, the school principal removed Williams as Athletic Director
and placed him on administrative leave. The Dallas Independent School
District (“DISD”) subsequently decided not to renew William’s contract as
athletic director. Williams pursued a § 1983 action against DISD and the
district court entered summary judgment in favor of DISD.53 Noting that
Garcetti has shifted the focus from the content of the speech to the role of
the speaker, the Circuit Court concluded that Williams’ memoranda to the
office manager and principal were written in the course of performing his
job as Athletic Director.54 Because Williams’ speech took place in his role
as an employee, not a private citizen, it was not protected by the First
Amendment.55
52. Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007).
53. Id. at 690–91.
54. Id. at 692.
55. Id. at 694. Accord Elizondo v. Parks, 431 F. App’x 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curium) (discussions between Arthur Elizondo, a Business Development Specialist for Minority
Business Development Center at the University of Texas at San Antonio, about his temporary
reassignment to the Small Business Development Center because of a budget shortfall, and his
contention the temporary transfer was fraudulent, despite the approval of the Small Business
Administration, were made pursuant to his employment duties and not protected by the First
Amendment). Cf. Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 514 (5th Cir. 2008) (emails sent by Shelton
Charles, a systems analyst employed by Texas Lottery Commission, to high ranking Commission
officials and members of the Texas Legislature raising concerns about racial discrimination and
retaliation against him and other minority employees had nothing to do with his employment
duties, and was private speech protected by the First Amendment); and Davis v. McKinney, 518
F.3d 304, 307–10, 314–16 (5th Cir. 2008) (complaint letter sent by Cynthia Davis, an IS Audit
Manager of the at the University of Texas Health Science Center in Houston, Texas (“the
Center”), up her chain of command to the University of Texas Chancellor and to the FBI and
EEOC, in which she alleged that her investigation, establishing extensive employee access of
pornography through their company computers, was swept under the rug, that the Center failed to
discipline offending employees, that she was required to view “horrific” pornography during the
course of her investigation, that white employees were treated more leniently than black
employees, that her male superiors excused the offending employees’ behavior, and that the
Center created highly compensated upper management positions and engaged in favoritism to
white men and persons with political connections in filling those positions, presented a “mixed”
speech case requiring the court to address each component of the complaint letter; the Court
concluded her complaint about the inadequate response to the pornography investigation
throughout the chain of command up to the Chancellor were made as part of her duties as an
employee and were not protected by the First Amendment, but her complaints about fiscal
mismanagement and her complaints sent to the FBI and EEOC had nothing to do with her job
duties, were not employee speech, and were protected by the First Amendment).
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Sixth Circuit

In Kingsley v. Brundige,56 Kay Kingsley, a former administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) at Ohio’s State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”),
was assigned to an unfair labor practice claim pursued by the Municipal
Construction Equipment Operators Labor Council (“the Union”) against
the City of Cleveland. She issued a discovery order in favor of the Union,
and the City of Cleveland appealed to the three-member SERB Board,
which remanded the matter to James Sprague, Chief ALJ, and Kingsley for
further review.
Contemporaneously, the SERB board ordered the
declassification of SERB ALJs as civil service positions and empowered
SERB’s Chairperson to hire and fire ALJs. Shortly thereafter Sprague
approached Kingsley and asked her to change her discovery order, and
Kingsley refused. On the following day, SERB’s executive director
notified Kingsley that she was being laid off. The layoff was confirmed by
letter dated October 26, 2009, stating her lay off would take effect on
October 30, 2009. Kingsley’s appeal to the State Personnel Board of
Review (“SPBR”) was denied because Kingsley was an unclassified
employee, depriving SPBR of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Ohio Court
of Appeals dismissed Kingsley’s request for a writ of mandamus and the
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Kingsley filed an action in federal district
court claiming that her First Amendment rights were violated.57 The
district court dismissed Kingsley’s complaint, and, after noting it did not
endorse the defendants’ actions in the case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
determining “Kingsley was acting pursuant to her official duties as ALJ
when she refused to retract the discovery order and substitute an order
reaching a different result” and there was “no civilian analogue to her
speech.”58 Hence her expression was made as a government employee,
rather than a citizen, and she was not protected by the First Amendment.59

56. Kingsley v. Brundige, 513 F. App’x 492 (6th Cir. 2013).
57. Id. at 494–95, 497–98.
58. Id. at 499.
59. Id. Accord Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Ed. of the Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist.,
624 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2011) (while the choice of classroom materials by a high school
English and creative writing teacher is a matter of public concern, and while her in-class speech
as a teacher outweighs the school board’s interest in efficiently delivering educational services,
the selection of pedagogical strategies and educational materials at the primary and secondary
school levels constitutes curricular speech which is not protected by the First Amendment); Fox
v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2010) (complaints by
elementary school special education teacher about the size of her caseload are made pursuant to
the teacher’s official duties and constitute speech as a government employee, which is not
protected by the First Amendment; hence her § 1983 claim of retaliatory employment action
stemming from the nonrenewal of her contract was dismissed); and Haynes v. City of Circleville,
Ohio, 474 F.3d 357, 364–65 (6th Cir. 2007) (former police officer’s objections to funding cuts for
canine training contained in a memo addressed to the police chief were made pursuant to his
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G. Seventh Circuit

In Fairley v. Andrews,60 Roger Fairley and Richard Gackowski, prison
guards at the Cook County jail in Chicago, reported abusive treatment of
prisoners by other prison guards, in response to which the prison guards
taunted and threatened them. When the abused prisoners filed suit, Fairley
and Gackowski told prison guards that, if subpoenaed, they would testify to
what they had seen and heard. The other prison guards were infuriated,
threatened to kill Fairley and Gackowski, subjected them to taunts and
physical assault, posted pornographic cartoons, and denied them the right
to use restrooms.61 The Sixth Circuit ruled that Fairley and Gackowski
were required by their employment duties to report the abusive treatment of
prisoners and hence were not protected by the First Amendment.62 To the
extent the other prison guards threatened and bullied Fairley and
Gackowski not to provide deposition testimony in the prisoners’ lawsuit,
however, such conduct “falls outside Garcetti” and is protected by the First
Amendment, because “courts rather than employers are entitled to
supervise the process,”63 and the government “cannot tell its employees
what to say in court . . . nor can it prevent them from testifying against it.”64
professional duties as a canine handler and constitute government employee speech not protected
by the First Amendment). See also Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2012), discussed below
in Part IV.
60. Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009).
61. Id. at 520–21.
62. Id. at 522.
63. Id. at 525.
64. Id. Accord Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 592–95, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (in conducting
their investigation and arrest of Vincent Ray on outstanding felony warrants, police officers
Alfonso Morales and David Kolatski learned that Ray may have been harbored by his sister,
Deputy Chief Monica Ray, and Police Chief Arthur Jones; Morales and Kolatski included this
information in an internal arrest report and shared it with the district attorney; subsequent
investigation by the district attorney’s office determined that the harboring charges against Jones
and Ray were false; Jones transferred Morales and Kolatski to night shift patrol duty in other
districts, and Morales provided deposition testimony accusing Jones of retaliation in another
officer’s civil action for retaliatory job transfer; the Morales and Kolatski matter went to trial, the
jury awarded compensatory ($20,000) and punitive ($65,000) damages in favor of the plaintiffs,
and the district court denied post-trial relief; the Seventh Circuit ruled Morales and Kolataki’s
actions in including the harboring charge in the internal report and reporting it to the district
attorney were made pursuant to their official employment duties and were not protected by the
First Amendment; however, Morales’ deposition testimony, given in a civil lawsuit, did not fall
within the scope of his employment duties and was protected by the First Amendment; hence the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of post-trial relieve with respect to Morales
and Kolatski’s claim concerning the reporting of the harboring charges, but, because it was
unclear whether the jury’s verdict in favor of Morales was made on the basis of the harboring
charge or the deposition testimony, remanded the matter to the district for a new trial on Morales’
claim.) See also Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 933–35, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (Herand
Abcarian, a physician and Head of the Department of Surgery at the University of Illinois College
of Medicine at Chicago (“the University”), engaged in a series of disputes with the University and
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H. Eighth Circuit

In Bonn v. City of Omaha,65 Tristan Bonn, Public Safety Auditor for
the City of Omaha, was fired after she published a report entitled
“Anatomy of Traffic Stops,” in which she describes citizens’ traffic stop
complaints, analyzes the practices of police that give rise to the
community’s repeated complaints, and recommends how police officers
could improve its relationship with “the communities of color.”66 As
Public Safety Auditor, Bonn’s job was to review and audit citizen
complaints about police officers and firefighters and to speak with media
organizations to disseminate her findings. Bonn commented in her report
that the Omaha Police Department was unsuccessful in recruiting a diverse
workplace, that young members of the community who experienced poor
policing tactics do not select policing as a career, and that Omaha residents
would like to see more diversity in the police forces in their neighborhoods.
After the report was published, she commented on her report on a local
radio show and spoke to the Omaha World Herald newspaper, which
published an article entitled “Mayor Sides with Police After Report.”67
Bonn pursued a § 1983 action against the City of Omaha, and the district
its employees over a variety of issues, such as risk management, faculty recruitment,
compensation and fringe benefits; in 2005, the University executed a settlement agreement to end
a potential lawsuit against Abcarian by the estate of John Behzad, a former patient; Abcarian
contended the University and its employees conspired to ruin his reputation and destroy his career
by settling the case; pursuant to the settlement, the estate initiated a lawsuit against Abcarian in
state trial court, informed the court the matter had been settled, and asked that it be dismissed;
when the state trial court did so, Abcarian filed a petition to vacate the dismissal; the University
intervened to oppose his petition, and the state trial court vacated the dismissal order but not the
settlement agreement; the Behzad estate voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit with prejudice, and the
state trial court’s order was affirmed on appeal; Abcarian then pursued a § 1983 action against the
University and individual defendants, claiming they retaliated against him for exercising his
freedom of speech; the district court dismissed the constitutional claims against the individual
defendants for failure to plead a claim on which relief can be granted, because Abcarian’s speech
was undertaken in the course of his official duties as a public employee; Abcarian appealed to the
Seventh Circuit, which ruled Abcarian’s speech covered topics which directly affected the
surgical department he headed and fell within the broad scope of his responsibilities, and affirmed
the district court.) See also Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Police Detective Martin Sigsworth’s report to his supervisors that members of a criminal task
force leaked word of a pending arrest to several suspects enabling them to avoid arrest was made
pursuant to his official duties, and was not protected by the first amendment); and Spiegla v. Hull,
481 F.3d 961, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2007) (correctional officer Nancy Spiegla, who was responsible
for maintaining the security of a prison by regulating and monitoring vehicle and foot traffic
through the prison’s main gate, spoke pursuant to her official duties and was not protected by the
First Amendment when she reported her immediate supervisor’s breach of prison security policy
to another supervisor). See also Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 770 F.3d 680 (2014),
Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006), and Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d
769 (7th Cir. 2008), which are discussed more fully below in Part IV.
65. Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 589–90.
67. Id. at 590.
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court granted summary judgment in its favor, because her published report
and statements to the media were not protected by the First Amendment.68
The Eighth Circuit agreed, ruling that Bonn admitted her report was
prepared as part of her official duties and, accordingly, Bonn was not
speaking as a citizen when she published her report and was not protected
by the First Amendment.69
I.

Ninth Circuit

In Marable v. Nitchman,70 Ken Marable, the senior chief engineer of
the Washington State Ferries (“WSF”), reported corrupt and wasteful “pay
padding” practices he observed among WSF management in assigning and
68. Id.
69. Id. at 592. Accord Buehrle v. City of O’Fallon, 695 F.3d 807, 809–12 (8th Cir. 2012)
(David Buehrle, a City of O’Fallon police officer, was placed on special assignment to conduct
corruption investigations of city employees at the request of the major, and reported on his
findings at a closed-door meeting of the City’s Board of Alderman at the request of the City
Administrator; the report angered the City Administrator, who prevailed upon the Police Chief to
deny promotion to Buehrle; because Buehrle’s speech was delivered as part of his official duties,
it was employee speech not protected by the First Amendment and could not support his § 1983
claim); Anderson v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 342 F. App’x 223, 224 (8th Cir. 2009) (per
curium) (reporting of possible pay irregularities, invalid service contracts, and a discrepancy in
budgetary funds made by Gary Anderson, the coordinator of technical support for information
management services, were made in the course of his duties as a government employee and were
not protected by the First Amendment); McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Medical Sciences, 559
F.3d 855, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (counter claims of sexual harassment filed by Al McCullough, a
Computer Project Program Director for the University of Arkansas for Medical Services
(“UAMS”) in response to employee complaints of sexual harassment and at the request of UAMS
as part of its investigation, were prepared as part of his employment duties and in his own selfinterest in preserving his job, and were not protected by the First Amendment); Cf. Lindsey v.
City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2007) (while the duties of Charles Lindsey, public
works director of the City of Orrick, included attending city council meetings and reporting about
public works issues, his public chastisement of city council for violating the requirements of
Missouri’s open meetings law at four meetings of city council and his announced intention of
bringing the matter to the attention of the attorney general, which lead to his being fired from his
job, was deemed to be citizen speech protected by the First Amendment, there being no evidence
indicating open meetings law compliance was part of his employment duties); Davenport v. Univ.
of Ark. Bd. of Trustees, 553 F.3d 1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 2009) (statements by Alfonso Davenport, a
public safety officer in the University’s Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) accusing DPS
Chief of misuse of resources and complaining about lack of DPS equipment, uniforms and
parking were not made as part of his official duties and were protected by the First Amendment;
Davenport’s statement to an Arkansas State Police investigator interviewing university employees
about DPS Chief’s private investigation firm were made as part of his official duties and were not
protected by the First Amendment). Contra Rynders v. Williams, 650 F.3d 1188, 1191, 1194–95
(8th Cir. 2011) (Buddy Rynders, an employee of the Garland County Road Department, pursued
criminal charges against two other members of the Department and wrote a letter published in the
local newspaper objecting to the withholding of wage increases; because these activities were
possibly undertaken in his role of citizen and material issues of fact existed concerning the actual
reason for Rynders’ employment termination, entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants
was erroneous.).
70. Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2007).
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claiming overtime compensation to enhance their pay. In response,
Marable was subjected to retaliatory employment actions, including
disciplinary proceedings, suspension from work, and, despite his repeated
requests that it be removed, prolonged exposure to a product called “Oil
eater 99,” which triggered an allergic reaction. Marable pursued a § 1983
action against his supervisors. The federal district, concluding Marable’s
expression was employee speech unentitled to First Amendment protection,
granted summary judgment to the defendants.71 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, ruling that reporting corruption of higher level officials did not
fall into his responsibilities as chief engineer, namely, making sure the
physical machinery on his ferry operated safely and properly, and Marable
was not responsible for ensuring his superiors did not engage in corrupt
financial schemes.72
71. Id. at 927–29.
72. Id. at 932–33. Accord Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1054–56, 1058–60
(9th Cir. 2013) (John Ellins, a City of Sierra Madre, California, police officer, who was also the
President of the Sierra Madre Police Association (“SMPA”), the recognized collective bargaining
unit for all classified employees of SMPA, successfully led a no-confidence vote of the police
officers’ union against Marilyn Diaz, the Chief of Police; Police Chief Diaz delayed approving
Ellins for an Advanced Peace Officer Standards and Training (“P.O.S.T.”) certificate, which
would have provide him with a five percent salary increase, and Ellins filed a § 1983 First
Amendment retaliatory employment action; the federal district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the City of Sierra Madre because Ellins failed to present evidence showing his
leadership in the no-confidence vote was citizen speech; the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the
no-confidence vote could make it difficult to recruit and retain officers, and hence was a matters
of public concern, and that Ellins’ employment responsibilities did not include serving as union
president or leading no-confidence votes, and hence a fact finder could determine his expression
was undertaken as a private citizen); Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1066–67,
1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (Martha Karl, the Confidential Administrative Assistant to Scott Smith, the
Chief or Policy of the City of Mountlake, California, provided deposition testimony in a federal
civil rights suit by a former police officer against Smith, after which she was transferred to a
probationary, part-time “records specialist” position, received unsatisfactory job performance
evaluations, and was later terminated; the district court ruled Karl’s deposition testimony was
given in her capacity as a private citizen, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that Karl’s
testimony was not “commissioned or created” by the City.); See also Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d
402 (9th Cir. 2014); which is discussed more fully below in Part IV; Cf. Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735
F.3d 1060, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (Angelo Dahlia, a detective with the City of Burbank Police
Department, filed internal reports and informed the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
(“LASD”) about the physical abuse of arrested suspects and, despite a campaign of threats and
intimidation by other officers, participated in interviews by Internal Affairs (“IA”) as part of its
investigation; following his interviews with IA, and upon learning of an FBI investigation,
officers incessantly threatened and harassed Dahlia to cease providing information; the district
court ruled Dahlia’s actions were undertaken as part of his official responsibilities and were not
protected by the First Amendment; the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that, while his internal
reports were been part of his official duties, his interviews with IA and his reports to the LASD
were citizen speech, rather than employee speech, and were protected by the First Amendment.);
Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545–46 (9th Cir. 2006) (reports of sexual exhibitionist behavior
by inmates submitted by Deanna Freitag, a correctional officer employed by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), were ignored by her superiors, she
complained to the associate warden, the warden, the director of CDCR and a California state
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Tenth Circuit

In Rohrbough v. University of Colorado Hospital Authority,73 Lisa
Rohrbough, who served as the “Transplant Coordinator” for the University
of Colorado Hospital’s Heart Transplant Unit. She worried that staffing
shortages delayed lab and medical tests, prevented timely update of patient
charts, and caused negative patient outcomes. She discussed her concerns
with nurses, her day-to-day supervisor, her manager, the director of the
Heart Transplant Unit, the vice president for patient services, the chief
nursing officer, the Hospital’s executive vice president and President, and,
at the suggestion of the President, with the Risk Management unit to which
she submitted eleven incident reports. Then, Rohrbough learned of a
possible heart misallocation and cover-up at the Hospital, which she
reported to the United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”), the
organization she contacted to place and remove patients on transplant lists,
and to a reporter for the Denver Westword, a weekly newspaper.
Following a negative performance evaluation, the Hospital placed
Rohrbough on administrative leave, reinstated her, and, when her
performance did not improve, terminated her employment. Alleging the
Hospital retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights,
Rohrbough pursued a § 1983 action against the Hospital.74 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, ruling Rohrbough’s reports of the alleged staffing crisis,
instances of substandard care contained in her incident reports, and heart
misallocation concerns “were all within the scope of her official duties,”
and were unprotected by the First Amendment.75
senator; her reports to her superiors, associate warden, and warden were performed pursuant to
her official duties and were not protected by the First Amendment; her reports to the CDCR
director were not clearly within her official duties and the Court remanded the case to make that
determination; her reports to the state senator constituted speech undertaken as a citizen and was
protected by the First Amendment).
73. Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741 (10th Cir. 2010).
74. Id. at 743–44.
75. Id. at 748–51. Accord Oleynikova v. Bicha, 453 F. App’x 768, 770–72, 775 (10th Cir.
2011) (Taissiya Oleynikova, an Information Technology Professional employed by the Colorado
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) Office of Information Technology Services (“OITS”)
became embroiled in a dispute between her immediate supervisor, Chuck Chow, and Meggin
Bennabhaktula, an outside contractor hired to implement software in the unit in which
Oleynikova and Chow worked; Oleynikova sided with Chow and opined in emails to Galina
Krivoruk, Chow’s supervisor, that Bennabhaktula was not performing her duties and was wasting
taxpayer money; Oleynikova’s applications for promotion were denied, and Oleynikova claimed
Krivoruk thwarted her promotion because Krivoruk sided with Bennabhaktula in her dispute with
Chow; Oleynikova filed a § 1983 retaliation action against the hospital, and the district court
granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment; the Tenth Circuit affirmed, ruling
Oleynikova’s statements about Bennabhaktula occurred as part of an intra-departmental personnel
dispute, were motivated by a personal grievance, addressed her own career advancement, and did
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not rise to the level of public concern); Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708,
711–12, 714, 716 (10th Cir. 2010) (Patricia Chavez-Rodriguez, director of the Santa Fe’s
Division of Senior Services, which provides meals, transportation and health care services to
elderly city residents, and which faced significant budget cuts, voiced her concerns about the
effect of these cuts directly to government officials and at the annual Volunteer Appreciation
Banquet honoring senior volunteers; Chavez-Rodriguez was subsequently removed from her
position and reassigned to a lower level position at a community center; the District Court ruled
Chavez-Rodriguez’s efforts to rescind the budget cuts were undertaken as part of her employment
duties and were not entitled to First Amendment protection; the circuit court affirmed because the
nature of Chavez-Rodrigues’s speech indicates it was undertaken in her role of director of Senior
Services and not as a private citizen.). Contra Trant v. Okla., 426 F. App’x 653, 656–57, 660–61
(10th Cir. 2011) (Collie Trant, who was appointed Chief Medical Examiner by the Oklahoma
Board of Medicolegal Investigations (“the Board”), made the following reports: (1) he informed
the Board that some OCME employees had given false accounts of sexual harassment by a
former co-worker; (2) he informed the Board that a grand jury indictment of an employee for
sexual harassment was based on false testimony provided by some OCME employees; (3) he
warned the board he planned to hire a lawyer to report the wrongdoing with the grand jury
investigation; and (4) through his lawyers, he announced to the media he had spoken to the
attorney general and planned to contact the FBI about the irregularities he discovered; the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the first two reports were made pursuant to Trant’s official duties, but the third
and fourth reports fell outside his duties and were protected by the First Amendment.); Deutsch v.
Jordan, 618 F.3d 1093, 1096–98, 1101–02 (10th Cir. 2010) (Robert Deutsch, police chief for the
City of Laramie, Wyoming, provided testimony in his civil lawsuit for defamation in small claims
court against a private citizen, who claimed Deutsch improperly used petty cash to buy a laptop
computer; Janine Jordon, the city manager, attended the trial, listened to Deutsch’s testimony, and
concluded Deutsch did not testify truthfully; Jordan and Deutsch met a few days later, and Jordan
fired Deutsch; Deutsch pursued a § 1983 action against the City and Jordan alleging he was fired
for providing testimony in his defamation action; the district court decided his testimony was not
part of his official duties, and denied Jordan’s motion for summary judgment; the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, ruling Deutsch provided his testimony for the private purpose of clearing his name and
responding to a charge of public corruption, and hence was a matter of public concern protected
by the First Amendment.); Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126,
1129–31, 1136–37 (10th Cir. 2010) (Janet Reinhardt, a speech-language pathologist (“SLP”)
employed by the Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education (“APS”) on an extended
contract at Rio Grande High School, regularly complained to APS that she received inaccurate
and untimely list of students needing speech and language services, thereby depriving students of
needed services; receiving no response from ABS, Reinhardt hired an attorney and filed a
complaint with the New Mexico Public Education Department (“NMPED”) against APS; the
state conducted an investigation and ordered APS to take corrective action; thereafter the
Assistant Principal reduced Reinhardt’s caseload below that required for a full-time SLPs and
converted her contract from an extended contract to a standard contract, thereby reducing her
compensation; Reinhardt pursued a § 1983 action against APS; the district court granted APS’s
motion for summary judgment on her First Amendment retaliation claim, because Reinhardt’s
communications were made pursuant to her official duties; the Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling
Reinhardt was hired to provide speech and language services to special education students, but
not to consult with an attorney and file a report with a state agency to ensure special education
students eligible for speech and language services receive them.). Thomas v. City of Blanchard,
548 F.3d 1317, 1319–22, 1324–26 (10th Cir. 2008) (Ira Thomas, building code inspector for the
City of Blanchard, was fired from his job after he discovered a signed and completed certificate
of occupancy for a home constructed by the mayor, even though Thomas had neither made the
final inspection of the home nor approved the certificate; Thomas stormed into a meeting and
angrily shouted his denunciation of the certificate at the City Clerk, reported the matter to the
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, and was fired from his job ten days later; concluding
Thomas’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties and hence was unprotected employee
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K. Eleventh Circuit

In Battle v. Board of Regents for the State of Georgia,76 Lillie Battle, a
financial aid counselor in the Office of Financial Aid and Veterans Affairs
(“OFA”) at Fort Valley State University (“FVSU”), discovered what she
thought were improprieties in some student files previously handled by her
supervisor, Jeannette Huff. Battle confronted Huff about the improprieties,
but was rebuffed. Battle then reported her concerns to FVSU President
Oscar Prater. Thereafter, Battle’s performance evaluations declined, she
was transferred to a different department, and, when no position was
available in that department, Battle was notified her employment would be
terminated. Battle appealed the nonrenewal of her contract, but the
grievance committee upheld the decision not to renew. Battle then met
with the Department of Education to report her findings, supported by 61
pages of documents showing potential fraud and a thirty-two page analysis
of student files. The Georgia Department of Audit conducted an
independent annual audit of FVSU, and uncovered serious noncompliance
with federal regulations and risk factors for fraud. Similar problems were
discovered in subsequent audits. FVSU reached a $2,167,941 settlement
with DOE to resolve questioned costs identified by the state auditors. Huff
pursued a § 1983 action in federal district court, claiming she was fired in
violation of her First Amendment rights to report her concerns about fraud.
The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.77
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, ruling Battle’s employment duties,
confirmed by her own admissions, required her to ascertain student files
were accurate and complete, and DOE guidelines mandated she report
fraud she discovered in financial aid files.78 Hence, her reports of
inaccuracies and fraud in student files were made pursuant to her official
employment duties and were not protected by the First Amendment.79
speech, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment; the Tenth Circuit
disagreed, ruling Thomas, in his capacity of building inspector, was expected to report fraudulent
issuances of certificates of occupancy to those higher up in his chain of command, but not to
outside state agencies, because Thomas was employed by the city to inspect houses not to assist
state agencies in their enforcement of criminal statutes aimed as public officials.).
76. Battle v. Bd. of Regents for the State of Ga., 468 F.3d 755 (11th Cir. 2006).
77. Id. at 757–59.
78. Id. at 761.
79. Id. at 761–62. Accord Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1280, 1283–86 (11th
Cir. 2009) (Daisy Abdur-Rahman and Ryan Petty were employed as compliance inspectors in the
Department of Public Works of DeKalb County, Georgia, and were directed to prepare
ordinances about the disposal of fat, oil and grease; those duties were later expanded to determine
whether grease disposal was the cause of sanitary sewer overflows; Abdur-Rahman and Petty
investigated two sewer overflows, became concerned that sewer overflows were not properly
reported and bioremediated as required by state and federal laws, and included these concerns in
reports to their supervisors; their employment was subsequently terminated, and Abdur-Rahman
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and Petty initiated a § 1983 action against their supervisors; the district court granted defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, ruling Abdur-Rahman
and Petty’s reports are not protected under the First Amendment, because their reports about
sewer overflows were based the information they requested and inspections they conducted in
fulfilling their job duties and were undertaken as part of their expanded responsibilities to
examine the effect of grease on sewer overflows.); D’Angelo v. Sch. Bd. of Polk Cty., 497 F.3d
1203, 1206–07, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2007) (Michael D’Angelo, the principal of Kathleen High
School, confronted by mediocre scores on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test and
denial of requests for additional staff and funding, actively supported the school’s conversion to a
charter school; when the initial vote by the faculty on the conversion failed, D’Angelo proposed
to convert part of the high school to charter status, but that endeavor was torpedoed by the school
superintendent, and D’Angelo was fired; D’Angelo pursued a § 1983 action, relying on Florida
law providing “[n]o district school board, or district school board employee who has control over
personnel actions, shall take unlawful reprisal against another district school board employee
because that employee is either directly or indirectly involved with an application to establish a
charter school.” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(4); The Circuit Court ruled that D’Angelo’s statements
seeking to convert Kathleen High School to a charter school were made pursuant to his duties as a
principal, not as a citizen, and were not protected by the First Amendment, because he pursued
his campaign to convert to a charter school in his role as high school principal and stated he did
so to fulfill his professional responsibilities.); Akins v. Fulton County, 278 F. App’x 964, 966-67,
971 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curium) (Plaintiffs, former employees in the purchasing department of
Fulton County, Georgia, reported bidding irregularities to the Fulton County Commissioner;
claiming they were constructively discharged from their jobs in retaliation for their reports, they
pursued § 1983 actions against the County; the district court determined plaintiffs regularly
communicated bid concerns to the commissioners as part of their routine employment duties, and
therefore were not protected by the First Amendment; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that,
even though plaintiffs had a duty to report bid irregularities to their supervisor but had no
affirmative duty to go outside the chain of command and report the irregularities to the
commissioners, their doing was nonetheless pursuant to their official duties and therefore was
government employee speech not entitled to First Amendment protection.); Boyce v. Andrew,
510 F.3d 1333, 1336–41, 1343–47 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curium) (Plaintiffs, Clarinda Boyce and
Katina Robinson, were case workers in the Child Protective Services Investigations Unit of the
Division of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) of the Georgia Department of Human
Resources (“DHR”); during the period 2002-2004 DFCS had difficulties in managing the
caseloads of case managers because of the extremely high number of cases assigned to them and
employee turnover; although steps were taken to assist case managers reduce their caseloads,
Boyce and Robinson frequently complained about the size of their caseloads verbally and via
email messages sent to their supervisors and in “Assignment Despite Objection” (“ADO”) forms
provided by their union; Boyce and Robinson were unsuccessful in closing assigned cases,
objected to the assignment of additional cases, and failed to meet work performance plans for
closing cases that were overdue; DFCS terminated Boyce’s employment because of her lack of
productivity, and transferred Robinson to a different job with lower pay in another division;
Boyce and Robinson pursued § 1983 actions against their supervisors; the district court ruled
defendants lacked qualified immunity and they filed an interlocutory appeal; the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, ruling that (1) Boyce and Robinson’s complaints were designed to have their caseloads
reduced and hence related to their employment responsibilities rather than raising public
awareness about child abuse caseloads, (2) the decisions to fire Boyce and transfer Robinson were
internal employee matters undertaken to enable DFCS to accomplish its work, and (3) Boyce and
Robinson’s verbal, email and ADO caseload complaints were communicated through internal
channels in the normal course of their duties, addressed personal grievances and frustrations with
their jobs, and have no civilian analogue; hence Boyce and Robinson’s expression is employee
speech not entitled to First Amendment protection, without which their supervisors are protected
by qualified immunity.).
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In Bowie v. Maddox,80 David Bowie, a former official in the District
of Columbia Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), claimed he was fired
because he refused to sign an affidavit prepared by OIG in response to a
subordinate’s employment discrimination claim. Bowie instead wrote his
own affidavit criticizing the manner in which OIG’s terminated the
subordinate. Bowie initiated a § 1983 action against OIC; the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of OIC;81 and the D.C. Circuit
affirmed.82 Bowie petitioned for rehearing, claiming Garcetti did not bar
his claim even though his speech was ordered by OIC, because private
citizens can provide testimony to the EEOC as part of an employment
discrimination claim and hence there was an analogue to civilian speech.
In making his argument, Bowie relied on Jackler v. Byrne,83 the Second
Circuit decision discussed above in Part II B, which found that Jackler’s
speech was protected by the First Amendment, even though it was provided
as part of his employment duties, because there was a civilian analogue in
the form of First Amendment protection of individuals who file complaints
about police brutality. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, stating the
Second Circuit “gets Garcetti backwards.”84 The D.C. Circuit reasoned
that providing First Amendment protection to a civilian’s refusal to
withdraw his complaint does not convey First Amendment protection to a
police officer who refuses to withdraw his report accusing other officers of
excessive force.85
Rather Garcetti requires different treatment of
government workers when their speech arises out of their official
capacities, and government worker utterances are unprotected even if the
same utterances by private individuals would be protected as citizen
speech.86 Because Bowie spoke as a government employee, the district
court’s ruling was correct, and the petition for rehearing was denied.87
80. Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
81. Id. at 46.
82. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
83. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011).
84. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
85. Id. at 48.
86. Id.
87. Id. Accord Winder v. Erste, 566 F.3d 209, 211–12, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Alfred
Winder, the general manager of the transportation division of the District of Columbia Schools
(“DCPS”), was responsible for transportation services for special education); Petties v. District of
Columbia, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127505 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2009) (class action law suit brought
by parents of special education students mandated exacting standards for that transportation and
oversight by a special master, with whom Winder regularly communicated; Winder believed his
supervisors were undermining his efforts to comply with the Petties orders and he frequently
reported his frustrations to the special master, straining his working relationship with his
superiors; problems intensified when the school bus drivers walked off the job to protest a cut in
benefits; Winder and his superiors attended a meeting of the D.C. Council Committee on
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M. Summary

The interesting array of circuit court decisions reviewed above
demonstrates that Garcetti has triggered the dismissal of a significant
majority of § 1983 claims by government workers and, because the focus is
on the employee’s duties in formulating and communicating the
expression, has produced a number of anomalies:
•

•

Providing policy recommendations as a member of an unpaid,
advisory board is unprotected speech within the scope of
employment (Foote, 1st Cir.), but changing the rules of
membership on those bodies may trigger violation of First
Amendment rights of members (LeFande, D.C. Cir.);
Testimony before the city council is within the employees’
duties and is not protected by the First Amendment (Winder,
1st Cir. and Buehre, 8th Cir.), but criticizing city council for

Education, Libraries, and Recreation scheduled to address the walkout, but Winder did not sit
with them at the witness table; dissatisfied with his superiors’ answers, a councilman called
Winder to the table, and Winder’s responses angered his superiors; Winder filed a complaint with
the D.C. Inspector General against his superiors, claiming they interfered with his job duties, filed
false affidavits, blocked compliance with Petties orders, and harassed him; while Winder was on
an approved medical leave, DCPS notified him he was fired from his job; Winder pursued a §
1983 actions against their supervisors, and the district court granted their motion for summary
judgment on Winder’s First Amendment claim; the D.C. Circuit affirmed, ruling Winder’s stream
of complaints to the special master, his complaint to the D.C. Inspector General, and his
testimony to the D.C. Council about the DCPS bus drivers were provided in fulfillment of, and
therefore pursuant to, his employment duties to comply with the Petties orders, and were not
protected by the First Amendment.); Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1141–42, 1150–51
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nadine Wilburn, interim director of the District of Columbia Office of Human
Rights (“OHR”), who pursued a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the District
and the OHR chief of staff, alleging she was not selected for the permanent OHR director positon
in retaliation for her complaints about D.C. salary policies; the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants; the D.C. Circuit affirmed, ruling Wilburn’s objections to the
D.C. salaries “easily” fell within her employment responsibilities, which included authority to
handle all personnel matters in her agency and to eliminate employment discrimination in the
District government, and hence were not protected by the First Amendment.). Contra LeFande v.
District of Columbia, 613 F.3d 1155, 1157-58, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Matthew LeFande, a
member of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Reserve Corps, a body of unpaid
volunteers who assist the police in delivering law enforcement services, was featured in a frontpage article in the Washington City Paper criticizing the Reserve Corps; the Reserve Corps
suspended LeFande’s membership, and LaFance sued the District; LeFande was reinstated when
that lawsuit was settled; the Reserve Corps subsequently changed its rules to permit Reserve Corp
members to serve at the pleasure of the Police Chief, and LeFande filed a class action lawsuit
challenging the legality of the rule change; the district court dismissed LeFande’s claims, and,
while the matter was on appeal, the Police Chief fired LeFande; LeFande then filed a § 1983 First
Amendment retaliation claim, which the district court dismissed, because LeFande’s claim did
not relate to a matter of public concern; the D.C. Circuit disagreed, ruling LeFande’s allegations
of procedural irregularities by the Police Chief may be a matter of public concern even if it relates
to a personnel matter, because it implicates a matter of concern to the community.).
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failing to comply with open meeting laws is protected
(Lindsey, 8th Cir.);
Pursuing claims of employment discrimination and serving as
a witness in a coworker’s claim of discrimination is not
protected speech (Brooks, 4th Cir.), but a systems analyst’s
sending emails state legislators to report employment
discrimination is (Charles, 5th Cir.);
An administrative law judge’s refusal to alter a discovery
order is not protected by the First Amendment (Kingsley, 6th
Cir.), but the refusal of police officers to back off of their
reports of excessive force employed against arrested suspects
is (Jackler, 3d Cir.);
Complaints by case workers over excessive assignment of
child abuse cases (Boyce, 11th Cir.) and by teachers over their
excessive case load of special education students (Fox, 6th
Cir.) are not protected by the First Amendment, but a
teacher’s complaints over the untimely reports of students
needing special education services (Reinhard, 10th Cir.) and a
contract service provider’s encouragement of parents to
pursue advocacy group support to reinstate special education
services may be (Decotiis, 1st Cir.);
Public safety officers’ responses to a state police investigation
inquiry about a police chief’s investigation firm (Davenport,
8th Cir.) and interviews of Burbank police detective with the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department are protected by
the First Amendment (Dahlia, 9th Cir.), but reports of
improper bidding procedures to the county commissioners are
not (Akins, 11th Cir.); and
Giving deposition testimony is deemed protected speech
(Deutsch, 10th Cir.; Karl, 9th Cir; Fairley, 7th Cir.; and
Morales, 7th Cir.), but serving as a witness in a coworker’s
employment discrimination claim is not (Brooks, 4th Cir.).

While most of the anomalies cited above can be resolved by a close
reading of the cases in question,88 one difference cannot: The Second
Circuit in Jackler ruled that government employee speech emanating from
88. See Robert J. Tepper and Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballow to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 171
(2009) (“Garcetti does create some anomalies. The capacity in which the employee complains
becomes all-important, and those complaints made outside of one’s job responsibilities—and
about which the speaker would presumably have less knowledge—are more likely to be protected
than complaints by a person in a position to know about the situation by virtue of job
responsibilities.”).
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their employment duties but nonetheless addressing significant issues of
public concern are protected First Amendment. Other circuits, strictly
adhering to Ceballos’s edict that government employees’ speech arising out
of their employment duties, did not. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Lane v. Franks to resolve a part of their differences.89

III. Lane v. Franks
In 2006, Edward Lane was hired as director of Community Intensive
Training For Youth (“CITY”), a statewide program for underprivileged
youth, offered by the Central Alabama Community College (“CACC”).
Because CITY faced substantial financial problems, Lane carefully
reviewed the program’s expenses and discovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an
Alabama State Representative on CITY’s payroll, had not reported to work
or performed any services for the program. Lane twice instructed Schmitz
to report for work, but she refused, and Lane fired her. Publicity about
Schmitz’s termination attracted the attention of the FBI, which initiated an
investigation into Schmitz’s CITY employment. Subpoenaed before a
federal grand jury in November 2006, Lane explained his reasons for firing
her. In January 2008, the grand jury indicted Schmitz on four counts of
mail fraud and four counts of theft of federal funds. In August 2008, Lane
testified under subpoena during Schmitz’s trial about his reasons for firing
her, but the jury failed to reach a verdict. About six months later, Lane
again testified under subpoena during Schmitz’s second trial, and the jury
convicted her of three counts of mail fraud and four counts of thefts of
federal funds.90
In January 2008, Steve Franks became the president of CACC. CITY
continued to experience financial difficulties stemming from budget cuts,
and Lane recommended that Franks consider layoffs of CITY employees to
address the shortfall. Franks did so, and in January 2009, he terminated
twenty-nine probationary employees, including Lane. When he later
discovered twenty-seven of the terminated employees were not
probationary, Franks rescinded their terminations. Only Lane’s and one
other employee’s terminations were not rescinded. In September 2009,
CACC eliminated the CITY program and terminated all remaining CITY
employees.91
Lane filed suit against Franks under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
Franks violated Lane’s First Amendment rights by firing him in retaliation
for his testimony against Schmitz. Relying on Garcetti, the District Court

89.
90.
91.

Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014).
Id. at 2375–76.
Id. at 2376.
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granted summary judgment in favor of Franks, because Lane learned the
information he testified about while working as director of CITY and he
provided testimony as part of his official job duties.92 Hence, Lane was not
speaking as a citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection.93
The Eleventh Circuit, also relying on Garcetti, affirmed in a per curium
decision.94 It reasoned that Lane’s speech owed its existence to his
professional responsibilities and was a product Lane created in his capacity
of director of CITY.95 Hence Lane spoke as an employee, not a citizen, in
giving his testimony, even if that testimony was provided pursuant to a
subpoena.96
Because, as noted infra in Part II, there was a split among the circuit
courts, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to “resolve discord
among the Courts of Appeals as to whether public employees may be
fired—or suffer other adverse employment consequences—for providing
truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary job
responsibilities.”97
The U.S. Supreme Court held that “the First Amendment protects a
public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by
subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities.”98 In doing
so, the Court employed the two-step analysis formulated in Garcetti: (1)
whether Lane’s subpoenaed testimony at Schmitz’s trials is speech as a
citizen on a matter of public concern, and (2) whether the government had
adequate justification for treating Lane differently from other members of
the general public based on the government’s needs as an employer.99
In answering the first inquiry, the Court noted initially that “[t]ruthful
testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his
ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.”100
Lane’s speech was “far removed from the speech in Garcetti,” and, unlike
Cabello’s speech in Garcetti, was not ordinarily within the scope of Lane’s

92. Id.
93. Id. at 2376; Lane v. Central Ala. Community College, 2012 WL 5289412, at*6 (N.D.
Ala. 2012).
94. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376.
95. Id.
96. Id.; Lane v. Cent. Ala. Comty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 710 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam).
97. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377; See also Ruth Major, The Battle Between a Public Employee’s
Right to Free Speech and a Public Employer’s interest in Protecting Its Operations Returns to the
Supreme Court for Another Round, 61 FED. LAW 17, 18 (MAY/JUNE 2014).
98. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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employment duties.101 Further, because the speech in question was related
to the investigation of public corruption, testimony by public employees is
critically important to successful prosecutions and constitutes speech as a
citizen, although it consists of information learned on the job.102 Likewise,
Lane’s testimony qualifies as speech “on a matter of public concern,”
because its content exposes misuse of state funds, a matter of great public
concern, and it is delivered in a judicial proceeding.103 Hence, Lane’s
speech passed the first of the two tests.104
In approaching the second test, the Court initially cautioned that a
public employee’s expression “is not categorically entitled to First
Amendment protection simply because it is speech as a citizen on a matter
of public concern.”105 Rather, the court must resolve the question posed in
Garcetti: “whether the government had ‘an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the public’
based on the government’s needs as an employer,” such as enhancing

101. Id. at 2379. In reaching this conclusion, the Court utilized a convoluted distinction that
inadequately demonstrates why Lane’s speech was “far removed” from Ceballos’s speech. Lane
conducted his audit, learned of the payments to a no-show state legislator, prepared his report to
the community college president, cooperated with the FBI investigation, and provided
subpoenaed testimony before the grand jury and criminal trials precisely because he was the
director of the CITY program. Ceballos conducted his investigation, prepared his report for the
district attorney, spoke and provided exculpatory evidence to counsel for defendant, and testified
as a witness called by defense counsel precisely because he was calendar deputy assistant district
attorney. The Court erroneously claims that Garcetti “said nothing about speech that simply
related to public employment or concerns information learned in the course of employment.” On
the contrary, Ceballos’ report clearly owed its existence to his professional responsibilities, and
Garcetti emphasized that Ceballos’ speech could not be considered citizen speech because he
prepared his memorandum as part of his official duties and was paid for the tasks he performed.
In slipping by this inconvenient language, the Court relies on language in Garcetti stating “its
holding did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue “concerned the subject matter of [the
prosecutor’s] employment,” because “[t]he First Amendment protects some expressions related to
the speaker’s job.” This unconvincing maneuver enabled the Court to conclude (1) “the mere fact
that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not
transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech,” and (2) the “critical question
under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s
duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” Id. at 2379.
102. Id. at 2380.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Court took the narrower of two paths in deciding Lane, noting the “importance of
public employee speech is especially evident in the context of this case: a public corruption
scandal.” Id. at 2380. See also Papandrea supra note 32, 300 (“The court could issue a relatively
narrow decision limited to the facts of the case.” Alternatively, the Court “could base its decision
on the broader argument that the First Amendment provides categorical protection for testimony
under oath, even when made within the scope of employment duties and perhaps even when the
employee appears voluntarily, rather than subject to a subpoena.”).
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efficiency in delivery of government services and maintaining discipline in
the workplace.106 Answering that question was easy:
[T]he employer’s side of the Pickering scale is
entirely empty: Respondents do not assert, and cannot
demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance
in their favor. There is no evidence, for example, that
Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’ trials was false or erroneous
or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive,
confidential, or privileged information while testifying.107
Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Lane’s testimony was entitled to
First Amendment protection.108
Even though the logic supporting them is questionable, two statements
in Lane are significant: (1) “the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns
information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not
transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech,” and (2)
the “critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself
ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely
concerns those duties.”109 These statements eliminate the confusion created
by Garcetti that equated information in reports prepared as part of the
employee’s duties as government employee speech not entitled to First
Amendment protection, and provides an important and additional
consideration in deciding whether the speech is citizen speech, namely
whether the government worker ordinarily provides testimony as part of the
job. The latter consideration may effectively exclude the court testimony
of employees who ordinarily testify as part of their employment duties
from First Amendment protection.110
A handful of appellate decisions following Lane demonstrate how
these changes are playing out. In Mpoy v. Rhee,111 Bruno Mpoy, a District
of Columbia probationary, elementary, special education teacher, was hired
on a provisional teaching license through The New Teacher Project into an
educational setting, which, if Mpoy’s allegations are true, was designed to

106. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380–81 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).
107. Id. at 2381.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2379.
110. See Papandrea, supra note 32 at 300 (“Depending on how the Court frames its holding,
it potentially would protect even those employees who testify within the range of their job duties,
like police officers, as well as those who appear in litigation that does not involve a matter of
public concern, including testimony in non-work related disputes.”).
111. Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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fail. Mpoy claimed his classroom was dirty and lacked needed books and
materials; his teaching assistants were hostile, refused to help him, and
undermined his efforts to provide instruction; his complaints and inquiries
to his principal were ignored; his principal directed him to falsify reports to
show his students were making acceptable progress, and when Mpoy
refused, enlisted two other teachers to falsify the records of Mpoy’s
students’ progress; his principal prepared negative performance evaluations
and refused Mpoy’s requests for an explanation; his principal suspended
him for five days for tardiness and failing to follow lesson plans, issued a
warning letter accusing Mpoy of failing to monitor his students and follow
fire drill procedures, and issued a second five day suspension for Mpoy’s
refusal to follow classroom observation instructions, and ignored Mpoy’s
request for an explanation of those actions. Frustrated, on June 2, 2008,
Mpoy sent a lengthy email to the chancellor, Michelle Rhee, complaining
about the principal’s actions. One sentence of that email referred to the
principal’s falsification of records of Mpoy’s students’ progress. Two days
later the principal called Mpoy to his office, and without providing an
explanation told Mpoy his teaching position would not be renewed. On
June 13, 2008, the principal issued a negative evaluation of Mpoy’s
performance during the previous year and, on July 9, 2008, personnel in the
chancellor’s office informed Mpoy he would receive a termination latter.
Claiming retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, Mpoy sued
The New Teacher Project, the District of Columbia, his principal, and Rhee
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the district court dismissed Mpoy’s claim against The New
Teacher’s Project, but permitted his claim for retaliation against the
principal and Rhee to proceed but only in their personal capacity. Mpoy
did not appeal that ruling.112 Deciding that Mpoy was speaking pursuant to
his official duties rather than as a private citizen and that the principal and
Rhee were entitled to qualified immunity, the district court subsequently
granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Rhee, the
principal, and the District of Columbia.113 On appeal, Mpoy conceded that,
except for the sentence accusing the principal of falsifying records of
Mpoy’s students’ performance, his email message contained speech uttered
in his capacity as an employee. The D.C. Circuit Court decided that,
because the key sentence referred only to Mpoy’s own students, and not the
students of other teachers, and because the email was sent through the
established chain of command, the sentence was prepared as part of
Mpoy’s official duties as a teacher to report problems he encountered in his

112.
113.

Id. at 289.
Id. at 287–89.
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classroom and was not entitled to First Amendment protection.114 While
the Circuit Court recognized Lane’s qualifier that employee speech uttered
within the employee’s ordinary duties was unprotected,115 it sidestepped
that issue by determining the principal and Rhee were entitled to qualified
immunity, because “it surely would not have been unreasonable for [the
principal and Rhee] to believe” that they were lawfully entitled to fire
Mpoy for sending the email.116
In Dougherty v. School District of Philadelphia,117 Francis Dougherty,
Deputy Chief Business Officer for the Philadelphia School district,
prepared a proposal and implementation plan for the installation of security
cameras in nineteen persistently dangerous schools.
Because the
procurement process was to be completed within thirty to sixty days
precluding the use of normal competitive bidding processes, Dougherty
was required to select a prequalified contractor that had an existing contract
with the School District.
Dougherty chose Security and Data
Technologies, Inc. (“SDT”). School Superintendent Arlene Ackerman
rejected the selection of SDT and insisted the contract be awarded to IBS
Communications, Inc. (“IBS”), a minority owned firm that was not a
prequalified contractor. Ackerman submitted the IBS implementation plan
to the School Reform Commission (“SRC”), which ratified the proposal
and transferred oversight of the contract to another department. Dougherty
then met with reporters for The Philadelphia Inquirer and informed them
of the improperly awarded contract. The Inquirer ran a story under the
headline “Ackerman Steered Work, Sources Say.” The next day Ackerman
threatened to fire Dougherty for leaking the information to the press, and,
following Ackerman’s directive, the School District’s most senior human
resources executive, suspended Dougherty.
The SRC subsequently
terminated Dougherty’s employment with the School District, and
Dougherty pursued a § 1983 claim against the School District and
Ackerman. Finding that Dougherty’s allegations were sufficient to
establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the district court denied
motions for summary judgment filed by the School District and Ackerman,
and an interlocutory appeal was taken to the Third Circuit.118 Viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Dougherty, the Court of Appeals
decided Dougherty did not speak pursuant to his employment duties when
he disclosed the information to the Inquirer, because his position had
nothing to do with communications to the press and the School District’s
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 292–94.
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 295.
Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila,, 772 F.3d 979 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 982–85.
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Code of Ethics discouraged such conduct.119 Further, the Court rejected the
School District’s argument that Dougherty’s expression was employee
speech, because it “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional
responsibilities.”120 Such a standard, the Court reasoned, went too far and
“would eviscerate citizen speech by public employees simply because they
learned the information in the course of their employment.”121 This
decision was buttressed by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lane, which
emphasized that the acquisition of information by virtue of public
employment does not transform speech into employee speech.122 Rather
the critical inquiry is “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within
the scope of the employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.”123 Hence, the Third Circuit ruled, Lane rejects the School
District’s contention that Dougherty’s speech owed its existence to his
employment duties.124
Gibson v. Kilpatrick125 involved alleged retaliation by Jeffrey
Kilpatrick, the mayor of the City of Drew, Mississippi, against Drew’s
Chief of Police, Anthony Gibson, for Gibson’s investigation into
Kilparick’s misuse of the city’s gasoline credit card for personal use, and
reporting that misuse to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Drug
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), the Mississippi Office of the State Auditor
(“OSA”), and the Mississippi Attorney General’s office. An investigation
ensued and OSA determined Kilpatrick misused the card and ordered him
to repay approximately $3,000 to the City of Drew for unauthorized use of
the card. Nine months later, Kilpatrick entered a series of written
reprimands into Gibson’s personnel file and made several requests to the
Board of Aldermen to remove Gibson as police chief on the grounds he
was insubordinate, lacked visibility in the community, and failed to work
sufficient hours. Gibson pursued a § 1983 action against Kilpatrick for
violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court reserved
judgment on whether Kilpatrick violated Gibson’s First Amendment rights
and also whether he was entitled to qualified immunity.126 Kilpatrick
moved for reconsideration of his qualified immunity defense, and the
district court determined he was not entitled to qualified immunity because
Gibson’s speech was protected under the First Amendment and that right
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 987.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 990.
Id.
Gibson v. Kilpatrick (“Gibson II”), 773 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 665.
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was clearly established.127 The Fifth Circuit decided that Gibson’s speech
was not protected by the First Amendment and reversed the district
court.128 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and remanded the
case to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration under Lane.129 Upon remand,
the Fifth Circuit decided that Gibson failed to meet his burden of proof to
demonstrate reporting Kilpatrick’s misuse of the credit card was part of his
ordinary and official duties.130 The Court noted several factors in the
record indicated Gibson acted within the scope of his ordinary duties: he
reported the credit card misuse to law enforcement officials he met in the
course of his official duties; he was required as police chief to detect and
prevent crime; as chief law enforcement officer, he had control over and
supervised all of the city’s police officers; he had no one beyond the Board
of Aldermen in a chain of command to which he would report the credit
card misuse; he conducted his investigation and reported the credit card
misuse during hours he worked as police chief, rather than on his personal
time after work. With respect to OSA, Gibson met with the OSA
investigator in Gibson’s office, coordinated the department’s resources
with OSA, and directed his employees to assist in the investigation. With
respect to the Attorney General, Gibson reported the credit card misuse to
the Attorney General in person while attending a Chief of Police
Conference. With respect to the FBI and DEA, the record showed Gibson
reported the credit card misuse to agents he previously met through his
official duties and conceded in a letter he wrote to the Kilpatarick and the
Board of Aldermen he worked with those agencies to reduce crime within
the City of Drew.131 The Court also noted that the record was silent with
respect to whether Gibson spoke to the FBI and DEA agents during
working hours, wore his uniform, and offered the assistance of the Drew
police department, and that the lack of such evidence clarifying Gibson’s
role when he reported the credit card use to the FBI and DEA caused the
Court to conclude Gibson failed to meet his burden of proof to provide
evidence showing (1) his reports were made as a citizen rather than in his
official capacity, and (2) Kilpatrick was not entitled to qualified
immunity.132 Because there was no genuine dispute as to the facts
appearing in the record and the court is required to take the record as it is,

127.
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Gibson v. Kilpatrick (“Gibson I”), 734 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2013).
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the Court concluded Gibson failed to produce evidence to establish his
constitutional rights were violated.133
In Burnside v. Kaelin,134 Thomas Burnside, a sergeant in the Neuces
County Sheriff’s Department (“the Department”) assigned to the patrol
division, also served as chairman of a law enforcement political action
committee (“the PAC”), a role he kept separate and apart from his
Department responsibilities. Burnside alleged in his complaint that, in
January 2012, Jim Kaelin, who served as sheriff in the Department, was up
for reelection. Kaelin approached Burnside while he was on duty and told
him the PAC should support Kaelin’s reelection campaign. Burnside
deferred saying that decision would have to be made by the vote of the
PAC’s members. A few days later, Kaelin informed Burnside he would be
moved to jail duty if the PAC did not support Kaelin’s candidacy.
Burnside supported Kaelin’s opponent in the election, the PAC did not
endorse or support Kaelin, and Kaelin was aware of both of these matters.
Shortly after the PAC failed to endorse Kaelin, Kaelin transferred Burnside
from the patrol position to jail duty, a much less desirable job. The transfer
was viewed as a demotion by the members of the Department. Burnside
continued to work at the jail for more than a year and, in March 2013, he
was fired because of the dissemination of a recording containing a threat by
Kaelin against another officer. Burnside alleged Kaelin violated his First
Amendment rights and pursued a § 1983 action against him and the
Department. Kaelin and the Department filed motions to dismiss the
complaint without answering it; the magistrate judge recommended the
denial of those motions; the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation; and Kaelin pursued an interlocutory appeal challenging
the denial of qualified immunity.135 The Fifth Circuit ruled: (1) Burnside’s
allegations of the retaliatory, demotion-like job transfer following his
refusal to endorse Kaelin’s political campaign were certainly sufficient to
constitute a violation of Burnside’s First Amendment rights of free speech
and association, but (2) Burnside’s allegations of his employment
termination because of the dissemination of the tape recording of Kaelin’s
threat against another officer were insufficiently developed to state a prima
facie case of retaliation, and (3) the PAC’s refusal to support Kaelin’s
reelection occurred thirteen months prior to Burnside’s termination and no
facts were alleged demonstrating a causal link between the two events,
without which Kaelin is entitled as a matter of law to qualified immunity
133. Id. The Court emphasized that it did not decide his report of criminal activity to outside
agencies was part of his official duties, but decided only that Gibson “failed to come forward with
evidence showing that his clearly established constitutional rights were violated.” Id.
134. Burnside v. Kaelin, 773 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2014).
135. Id. at 625–26.
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on the termination claim.136 Hence the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court denial of qualified immunity as to the termination claim and affirmed
the denial of qualified immunity as to the transfer claim.137
In Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State University,138 a staff member in
the office of U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert asked Christian Cutler,
the Director of Art Galleries at Stephen F. Austin State University (“SFA”),
to curate and judge a high school art exhibition and contest hosted by
Gohmert. Cutler conducted internet research on Gohmert, concluded he
did not want to be associated with Gohmert, and so informed the staff
member. Representative Gohmert sent a letter to Cutler expressing his
disappointment that Cutler did not want to be involved with Gohmert and
stated he would not bother Cutler in the future. Gohmert sent a copy of the
letter to Baker Pattillo, the President of SFA, who in turn asked the
Provost, Richard Berry, to look into the matter. Berry asked the Dean of
the Fine Arts College, Addison Himes, to ascertain Cutler’s story. Himes
then recruited Scott Robinson, the Director of the School of Art Galleries
and Cutler’s boss, to assist. Robinson telephoned Cutler that evening and
took notes of their conversation. The next morning, Robinson, Himes and
Berry met to discuss the telephone call and review prior reports of Cutler’s
conduct. The following day, Cutler sent an email to Patillo, Hines, and
Robinson explaining the incident. The next day, Cutler met individually
with Himes and Berry, and Berry asked Himes to fire Cutler. Four days
later, Himes presented Cutler with a termination letter from Berry, and
Cutler accepted an invitation to resign immediately. Cutler pursued a §
1983 action against Pattilo, Perry, Himes, and Robinson claiming
retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. Following
discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion, concluding genuine issues of material fact existed with
respect to who exerted influence over the ultimate decision, whether
defendants conducted a reasonable investigation, whether Cutler or the
Defendants reasonably believed Cutler’s response to Gohmert’s invitation
was undertaken as a private citizen or public employee, and whether
defendants were protected by qualified immunity.139 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the denial of summary judgment, ruling (1) defendants should
have had a clear warning terminating Cutler would violate his First
Amendment rights, because Cutler explained why he declined the
invitation to host an exhibition which was not within the scope of his job;
(2) defendants failed to undertake a sufficient investigation prior to firing
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 629.
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Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin St. U., 767 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 466–67.
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him because evidence in the record demonstrated defendants ignored
Cutler’s explanation and focused on the SFA’s relationship with Gohmert,
Berry directed Himes to fire Cutler before Cutler spoke to Berry, and
Himes admitted there wasn’t an investigation per se; (3) defendants should
have known their investigation was inadequate because they prepared no
report, operated in an ad hoc manner, conducted only two interviews, and
acted hastily firing Cutler; and (4) their investigation was not conducted in
good faith.140 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to
deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment, noting that their decision
did not preclude defendants from establishing qualified immunity at trial.141
In Flora v. County of Luzerne,142 Albert Flora, Jr., the Chief Public
Defender for the Luzerne County Office of the Public Defender (“the
Office”), engaged in a protracted battle with the County to appropriate
additional funding to enable the Office provide adequate legal
representation to indigent criminal defendants. Unsuccessful in obtaining
the requested funding, Flora initiated a class action lawsuit against Luzerne
County seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the County to provide
adequate funding, office apace and attorney staffing. The state court
granted Flora’s petition for mandamus, ordered the County to provide
adequate funding and staff to the Office, and directed the parties into
mediation. While the mediation proceeded, the County amended the
Office’s budget making the Chief Public Defender’s position full-time and
maintaining a part-time Assistant Public Defender. Contemporaneously,
the Luzerne County “Kids for Cash” scandal unfolded, revealing that
between 2003 and 2008, approximately fifty percent of juvenile offenders
in Luzerne County appeared in court without legal representation, about ten
times the state average. Virtually all of them were adjudicated delinquent
and sent to for-profit juvenile detention facilities. A federal investigation
revealed that two Luzerne County judges accepted kickbacks from the forprofit detention facilities for sending the juveniles to those facilities. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court responded to these revelations by appointing
a Special Master, who recommended the expungement of the delinquency
adjudications.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved his
recommendation and ordered the expungement. Flora subsequently learned
that over 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged, and brought that
matter to the attention of the County, the district attorney, the court
administrator, the public interest law firm, which represented the juveniles,
and the Special Master. Roger Lawton, the County Manager, who was
angry Flora reported the expungement matter to the Special Master,
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 473–75.
Id. at 475.
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subsequently interviewed Flora for the full-time Chief Public Defender
position, but recommended that a different attorney be appointed to the
position.
Lawton’s recommendation was approved by the County
Commissioners, and Lawton informed Flora on April 17, 2013, that he was
relieved of his duties as Chief Public Defender. Flora pursued a § 1983
action against Lawton and Luzerne County, claiming his termination was in
retaliation for his efforts to secure adequate funding for the Office and his
reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court
concluded those actions “related to his official duties as Chief Public
Defender” and therefore were not protected by the First Amendment under
Ceballos, and dismissed Flora’s complaint.143 The Third Circuit reversed.
The Court noted that Lane was decided after the district court reached its
decision and that Lane requires a determination that Flora’s actions were
within his ordinary job duties, rather than merely being related to those
duties, in order to take those actions outside the ambit of First Amendment
protection.144 The Court then examined Flora’s allegations and determined
a “straightforward application of Lane leads us to conclude that . . . Flora’s
speech with respect to both the funding litigation and the expungement
problems was not part of his ordinary responsibilities.”145 Flora’s ordinary
job duties required him to represent indigent defendants in criminal court,
not to institute litigation to obtain adequate funding for his office or
publically report lingering effects from government corruption.146 Hence
Flora’s complaint should have survived the motion to dismiss.147
As the above noted circuit court decisions indicate, post-Lane
consideration of § 1983 claims requires closer consideration of the
relationship between the employee’s speech and the employee’s ordinary
duties. Instead of merely examining whether the information included in
the speech was gathered in the course of, or somehow related to, the
employee’s job duties, courts are required to examine whether engaging in
the speech was part of the ordinary duties the public employee performs.
In Mpoy, the D.C. Circuit recognized it was required to determine whether
Mpoy’s speech was undertaken as part of his ordinary duties as a teacher,
but avoided resolving that issue by deciding the school principal and
superintendent were entitled to qualified immunity. In Dougherty, the
Third Circuit examined Dougherty’s ordinary employment duties and,
following Lane, decided his speech fell outside those duties and was
entitled to First Amendment protection. In Gibson, the Fifth Circuit closely
143.
144.
145.
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147.
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examined the circumstances in which Gibson gathered and reported
evidence of the mayor’s misuse of the city’s gasoline credit card for
personal use and concluded Gibson could not survive defendant’s motion
for summary judgment because Gibson failed to produce evidence
demonstrating his reporting of the credit card misuse was undertaken
outside of his ordinary employment duties. In Burnside, the court
examined Burnside’s duties as a police officer and as chairman of a
political action committee, determined they were wholly separate, and
ruled the sheriff’s demotion of Burnside to a different position was in
violation of the First Amendment. In Cutler, the Fifth Circuit determined
that the actions of the defendants undertaken in response to Cutler’s
expressed disdain for a U.S. congressman demonstrated Cutler’s speech
was outside his ordinary employment duties. In Flora, the Chief Public
Defender’s action in initiating a class action lawsuit to obtain adequate
funding and reporting the noncompliance with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court order to expunge juvenile adjudication records were deemed outside
the ordinary scope of his duties and hence may be protected by the First
Amendment. In short, while four decisions determined the employee
speech was entitled to First Amendment Protection and two did not, all six
addressed the issue of the employee’s ordinary employment duties.

IV. Garcetti and Scholarship and Teaching
As noted above in Part I, the U.S. Supreme Court disclaimed whether
the Garcetti applied “in the same manner to a case involving speech related
to scholarship or teaching”148 in public institutions of higher education,
148. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006). This disclaimer is not surprising in
light of Justice Souter’s concerns in his dissenting opinion about the impact of the majority
decision’s on the “teaching of a public university professor” and the nation’s commitment to
safeguarding academic freedom, id. at 438, and the prior, vociferous statements of the U.S.
Supreme Court urging strong First Amendment protection of academic freedom. See Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools
(citation omitted). ‘The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative
selection.’”); Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“The essentiality of freedom in the
community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any
strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future
of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries
cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles
are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
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leaving that issue for another day. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
addressed the question, permitting the circuit courts to fend for themselves
in resolving § 1983 retaliation claims by university professors. A review of
the decisions by the circuit courts addressing § 1983 claims pursued by
college and university faculty members indicates the circuit courts have
taken different routes: some have applied Garcetti without addressing
academic freedom; some have considered whether the faculty member’s
speech falls within the realm of academic freedom and determined it is
employee speech not protected by the First Amendment; and some have
determined that Garcetti should not be applied to faculty member’s speech
which falls within the realm of academic freedom.
In Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College,149 Martha Louise Piggee, a parttime instructor of cosmetology at Carl Sandburg College, a public
community college located in Galesburg, Illinois, learned that Jason Ruel, a
student who had taken several of her classes, was gay. Piggee placed two
religious pamphlets in Ruel’s smock during clinical instruction time in a
combined classroom and clinical lab which made to look like a beauty
salon open to the public, and asked him to read and discuss them with her.
The pamphlets, which used a comic book format to condemn
homosexuality as an abomination, insulted and offended Ruel, who filed a
written complaint with various college officials. The College investigated
Ruel’s complaint and Piggee affirmed Ruel’s account. In a memo
addressed to Piggee, the College directed her to cease all proselytizing
activities. In a subsequent letter sent to Piggee, the College informed her
that her contract would not be renewed for the Spring semester. Piggee
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”); and Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools. ‘By limiting the power of the States to
interfere with freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the
Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But, in view of the
nature of the teacher’s relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the
Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action
upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of those amendments vividly into
operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers . . . has an unmistakable
tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and
practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential teachers.’ (cit.
omitted). ‘Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate.’”). The following
publication provides an extremely helpful discussion of academic freedom following Garcetti:
Patrick P. Schaffer, A Guide to Academic Freedom, C.U.N.Y BULLETINS (Jan. 2, 2012),
http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/vc_la/2012/01/02/a-guide-to-academic-freedom/.
The following
article provides an excellent example of the importance of academic freedom in protecting
faculty members who conduct research in politically charged subject areas: Paul Voosen,
Fracking Researchers Under Pressure, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Jan. 30,
2015), http://chronicle.com/article/When-Science-Becomes-a/151501.
149. Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006).
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pursued a § 1983 action against the College and the district court entered
summary judgment in favor of defendants.150 In affirming the district
court, the Seventh Circuit assumed that Piggee’s proselytizing speech
qualified as a matter of public concern, even though “it certainly had
nothing to do with how to style hair,” and focused on the second threshold
question: Whether the College had the right to insist Piggee refrain from
engaging in that particular speech while providing instruction in
cosmetology.151 Piggee’s speech occurred in the instructional area
provided by the College for her course, in which students received
classroom instruction and engaged in hands-on clinical work under their
instructors’ supervision. Piggee admitted in her testimony that she gave
various religious pamphlets to other students as part of her “witness”
activities, and made religious comments to her students during class.
Indeed, several of her students complained about her doing so in their
student evaluations. Under these circumstances, the Seventh Circuit ruled,
it would certainly be within the College’s prerogative “to direct its
instructors to keep personal discussions about sexual orientation or religion
out of a cosmetology class or clinic.”152 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court acknowledged that applying Garcetti “to the educational setting
requires an appreciation of the way in which teachers, professors or
instructors communicate with their students” and that “academic freedom
has two aspects,” the right of faculty members to pursue and discuss ideas
and to engage their students in the classroom free from governmentsponsored orthodoxy, and the right of the university to establish its
curriculum.153 These two aspects intersect, the court noted, because the
university in setting its curriculum may insist the faculty members teach
and conduct research as part of their official duties, while at the same time
protecting the faculty members’ freedom to express views on the assigned
course.154
In Renken v. Gregory,155 Kevin Renken, a professor of engineering at
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, applied for and received a grant in
the amount of $66,499 from the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) to
enhance the education of engineering undergraduates by adding laboratory
components to certain courses in their curriculum. The grant proposal
included provisions for released time for Renken to manage the grant as
principal investigator, salaries for student workers, and the university’s
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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cost-sharing funds in the amount of $222,667. Renken and William
Gregory, the Dean of the College of Engineering and Applied Science,
disagreed about the application of the university’s cost-sharing funds and
Renken filed complaints against Gregory with the University Committee
and the Board of Trustees, contending conditions Gregory imposed on the
cost-sharing funds violated NSF matching funds regulations. When their
dispute could not be resolved, the university returned the NSF funds.
Renken pursued a § 1983 action against Gregory, contending his pay was
reduced and his grant was terminated in retaliation for his exercise of his
First Amendment rights in criticizing the university’s proposed use of the
grant funds. The district court granted the university’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding Renken’s complaints were raised as part of his
official employment duties and did not relate to a matter of public
concern.156 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the NSF grant,
designed to benefit undergraduate student education, fulfilled his teaching
responsibilities and that his complaints about the misuse of cost-sharing
funds were made pursuant of his role as a faculty member administering
the grant.157 Hence, the First Amendment did not protect his statements.158
While the Court determined Renken’s speech was undertaken as part of his
employment duties as a teacher, the Court simply applied Garcetti to
Renken’s actions and did not address whether they fell into the realm of
academic freedom.
Gorum v. Sessions159 presented a very different scenario. An audit
undertaken by the Registrar’s Office of Delaware State University revealed
that Wendell Gorum, Professor of Communications and Chair of the
Department of Mass Communications at Delaware State University, had
improperly changed the grades of 48 students in the Mass Communications
Department from withdrawals, incompletes, and failing, to passing grades,
and Allen Sessions, President of Delaware State University, initiated
dismissal proceedings against Gorum. The matter was referred to an Ad
Hoc Disciplinary Committee under the collective bargaining agreement,
which concluded that Gorum acted wrongfully in effecting the grade
changes, condemned his actions, and recommended a two-year unpaid
employment suspension rather than termination of employment. Sessions
disagreed, proceeded with the termination action, and urged the Board of
Trustees to fire Gorum.160 The Board agreed and voted to dismiss Gorum.
Gorum filed suit in federal district court, contending Sessions’ actions to
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 771–73.
Id. at 773–74.
Id. at 773–75.
Gorum v. Sessions, 561 F.3d. 179 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 182–83.
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have his employment terminated were undertake in retaliation to three
incidents: (1) Gorum publicly opposed the selection of Sessions as the
president of Delaware State University; (2) Gorum was zealous in his
defense of a football player accused of weapons violations; and (3) Gorum
revoked an invitation to Sessions to speak at the Alpha Phi Alpha
fraternity’s Martin Luther King, Jr. Prayer Breakfast.161 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Sessions, concluding all three of
Gorum’s cited speech incidents occurred within his official duties and were
not protected by the First Amendment.162 The Third Circuit affirmed,
ruling Gorum’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment, because
(1) Gorum spoke as an employee not a citizen in providing assistance to the
student athlete and serving as an advisor to the fraternity, and his speech
was not a matter of public concern, and (2) Sessions would have
recommended Gorum’s termination whether or not he engaged in protected
speech, because Gorum’s disregard for the academic integrity of the
university was reprehensible and warranted dismissal.163 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court acknowledged that a question existed regarding the
application of Garcetti to “academic scholarship or classroom instruction,”
but decided Gorum’s “actions clearly were not speech related to
scholarship and teaching” and disciplining him for his actions did not
“imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public
colleges and Universities.”164
In Adams v. University of North Carolina-Wilmington,165 Michael
Adams, Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of North
Carolina-Wilmington, was denied promotion to Full Professor, because his
department chair, in consultation with the senior faculty members in his
department, concluded his scholarship was insufficient to warrant
promotion. Four years before applying for promotion to Full Professor,
Adams converted to Christianity and, in the process, transformed his
ideological views.
Adams became increasingly vocal about his
conservative political and religious beliefs and expressed them in columns
in Townhall.com and commentary on radio and television broadcasts. He
published a book entitled Welcome to the Ivory Tower of Babel:
Confessions of a Conservative College Professor. The materials Adams
assembled in his promotion application included not only descriptions of
his refereed, scholarly publications but also citations of his external
writings and his Tower of Babel book publication, his assistance to student
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 183–84.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 185–88.
Id. at 186.
Adams v. Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Christian groups through his columns, positive comments from a
syndicated talk show host, and frequent speeches on conservative issues to
various organizations and universities and on radio and television. Denied
promotion, Adams pursued a § 1983 claim against the University, claiming
that his First Amendment rights had been violated. Following discovery,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as
to all claims, including Adams’ First Amendment claim.166 The district
court concluded that, because Adams referenced his columns, publications,
and public appearances in his promotion application, he acknowledged
those activities were undertaken as part of his duties as a university
professor, and hence he did not speak as a private citizen and was not
protected by the First Amendment.167 Observing that Adams’ columns,
publications and public appearances were certainly protected by the First
Amendment when originally made, the Fourth Circuit was puzzled how
that district court could retroactively strip them of that protection upon a
later reading of Adams’ speech, albeit in a different context,168 and decided
“that Garcetti would not apply in the academic context of a public
university as represented by the facts of this case.”169 Garcetti should not
apply to the academic work of a faculty member at a public university, the
Fourth Circuit insisted, because it would eliminate First Amendment
protection given to “many forms of public speech or service a professor
engaged in during his employment,” and because “Adams’ speech was not
tied to any more specific or direct employee duty than the general concept
that professors will engage in writing, public appearances, and service
within their respective fields.”170 Hence, Adams’ speech was “that of a
citizen speaking on a matter of public concern,” and was protected by the
First Amendment.171 Notably, then, Adams found that it was inappropriate
to apply Garcetti to the research record of academics and thereby strip their
publications of First Amendment protection.172

166. Id. at 553–56.
167. Id. at 561.
168. Id. at 561–62.
169. Id. at 562.
170. Id. at 564.
171. Id. at 565.
172. See Kerry Brian Melear, Garcetti, Faculty Speech, and the Official Duties Standard in
Higher Education: Analysis of the Fourth Circuit’s Decision in Adams v. University of North
Carolina-Wilmington, 274 ED. LAW REP. 353, 367 (2012) (“The Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Adams . . . found that Garcetti was inapplicable to the faculty speech at question. However, the
gradient issue at play in that case involves the fact that the speech involved did in fact involve
publications and presentations, albeit not directly bound to the academic area in which the faculty
member worked.”).
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Savage v. Gee173 arose out a dispute in selecting a book to be assigned
to all incoming freshmen which escalated into the resignation of Scott
Savage, the Head of Reference and Library Instruction at Ohio State
University’s Bromfield Library, and his subsequent § 1983 claim for
constructive discharge in retaliation for engaging in protected speech
“related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction.”174 The district
court ruled that, while Savage’s speech addressed a matter of public
concern, it was made as part of his official duties and was not protected by
the First Amendment.175 The Sixth Circuit agreed, ruling that Savage’s
speech as a committee member commenting on a freshman book selection
was not made pursuant to classroom instruction or academic scholarship,
but was made pursuant to the librarian’s official duties, and hence was not
protected by the First Amendment.176 In reaching its decision, the Sixth
Circuit addressed neither the Garcetti disclaimer nor the issue of academic
freedom accorded teaching and research.
In Meade v. Moraine Valley Community College,177 Robin Meade, an
adjunct faculty member employed by Moraine Valley Community College
(MVCC), wrote a letter to the League for Innovation in the Community
College complaining about MVCC’s poor treatment of adjunct faculty
members. She signed the letter in her capacity as president of the MVCC
Adjunct Faculty Organization, the union representing the adjunct faculty at
MVCC. MVCC fired Meade two days later, citing her letter as the reason
for her termination. Meade pursued a § 1983 claim against MVCC,
contending it retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment
rights.178 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the content of Meade’s letter
addressed matters of public concern and was protected by the First
Amendment.179 In reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit does not
address the issue of academic freedom accorded teaching and research.
In Demers v. Austin,180 David Demers, an associate professor of
communications in the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication
(“Murrow College”) at Washington State University, also owned and
operated Marquette Books, an independent publishing company.181
Demers prepared and distributed a two-page plan to restructure the Murrow
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 739.
Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 770 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 686.
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 406.
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College by separating the Mass Communications faculty, who had a more
practical, professional orientation, from the Communications Studies
faculty, who had a more traditional academic orientation, appointing a
director of the Mass Communication faculty, and giving faculty with
professional backgrounds more prominence.182 Demers posted the plan on
the Marquette Books webpage, gave copies to various administrators,
Washington state journalists, and the Murrow College advisory board, but
did not give the plan to the “Structure Committee,” which was reviewing
and deliberating on proposals to restructure the Murrow College, or to the
Interim Director of the Murrow College.183 Demers concurrently prepared
drafts of the introduction and some chapters of a book entitled The Ivory
Tower of Babel, and submitted copies of these materials in his 2006 annual
faculty report and his 2007 application for sabbatical leave. Demers
claimed his book demonstrated that social science plays an insignificant
role in solving social problems and was critical of academic institutions,
including Washington State University.184 Pursuing a § 1983 action,
Demers claimed the defendants retaliated against him for distributing
copies of the plan and The Ivory Tower of Babel materials in violation of
his First Amendment rights. These retaliatory actions include spying on his
classes, keeping him off certain committees, initiating two internal audits,
excluding him from heading the journalism program, and lowering his
performance evaluations in 2006, 2007, and 2008, thereby cutting his
compensation and injuring his reputation. The district court determined
that the plan and the Ivory Tower of Babel materials were written pursuant
to Demers’ official duties and hence were not protected by the First
Amendment, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.185
The Ninth Circuit agreed that Demers was acting in his capacity and
pursuant to his duties as a Washington State University professor when he
prepared and distributed the plan.186 He solicited comments from his
colleagues on the plan; he was a member of the Structure Committee when
he sent the plan to the President and Provost; he cited the plan as an
accomplishment in his annual report.187 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
however, that Garcetti applied to teaching and academic writing; rather,
those activities were protected by the First Amendment under the two-part
analysis established in Pickering: (1) the employee must show his speech
addressed a matter of public concern, and (2) the employee’s interest in
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id. at 408–09, 414.
Id. at 410.
Id.
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commenting matters of public concern outweighs the interest of the state,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of public services it
provides.188 Because Demers did not include a copy of the Ivory Tower of
Babel materials in the record, the Ninth Circuit could not determine those
materials triggered the acts of retaliation alleged by Demers.189
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit decided (1) the plan distributed by Demers
was related to teaching or scholarship, because, if adopted, it would have
altered the nature of what was taught in the program and the faculty
teaching in it;190 and (2) the plan addressed matters of public concern,
because it proposed a change in the basic direction and focus of the
communications program, addressed the same topic for which the
“Structure Committee” had contemporaneously been assembled, and was
widely distributed both within and outside the university.191 Notably, then,
the Ninth Circuit addressed the disclaimer in Garcetti, and ruled that, while
Garcetti requires the court to determine whether the speech was undertaken
pursuant to the employee’s duties, Garcetti does not determine whether the
speech is protected by the First Amendment; rather, that role is played by
Pickering.192
As the above noted circuit court decisions indicate, two circuit court
decisions (Piggie and Gorum) addressed the issue of academic freedom in
reaching their decisions that the faculty members’ speech was not protected
by the First Amendment. Three decisions (Renken, Savage, and Meade)
determined the faculty members’ speech was part of their ordinary duties
and was not protected by the First Amendment, but did not address the
issue of academic freedom. Two decisions (Adams and Demers) decided
that Garcetti should not be applied to the speech of faculty members when
188. Id. at 412.
189. Id. at 414.
190. Id. at 415.
191. Id. at 416–17. The Ninth Circuit did not address the second Pickering inquiry. The
Ninth Circuit’s determination the attribution of First Amendment protection to Demers’ speech
should be determined by Pickering, not Garcetti, was a pyrrhic victory for Demers, however,
because the Ninth Circuit also ruled the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity against
Demers’ First Amendment claim. Id. at 417. See Ninth Circuit Finds Garcetti Official Duty Rule
Inapplicable to Professorial Speech in Public-University Context, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1823, 1826
(2014).
192. See Oren R. Griffin, Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech in the Post-Garcetti
World, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013) (“A view of post-Garcetti jurisprudence suggests that
lower courts are prepared to determine that academic speech outside of teaching or scholarly
functions, but within the scope of a faculty member’s professional duties, may be beyond the
protective reach of the First Amendment. However, when the speech at issue is related to
scholarship or teaching, the Pickering-Connick analytical framework shall remain applicable to
resolve public sector free speech claims.”). See also Arthur Willner, Ninth Circuit Upholds
Professor’s First Amendment Claim in Demers v. Austin, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y
PRAC. GROUPS 40 (2014).
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their speech falls into the realm of academic freedom. This array of
decisions underscores the need for clarification with respect to the
application of Garcetti to public college and university faculty members.193

Conclusion
This article has attempted to examine two major developments
stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Garcetti: (1) the surge
of circuit court decisions dismissing § 1983 employment retaliation claims
because the courts determined the expression was derived from the
government employees’ actual duties; and (2) the Court’s disclaimer as to
whether the Garcetti analysis applied “in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the first development in Lane, and
decided the mere fact the government employee acquired the information
included in the employee’s expression through public employment does not
transform that expression into government employee speech, and the
speech at issue must ordinarily be made within the scope of the employees
duties to fall under the umbrella of government worker speech. That this
qualification may restore First Amendment protection so some government
worker speech is seen by an examination of circuit court decisions
following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lane.

193. See Larry D. Spurgeon, The Endangered Citizen Servant: Garcetti versus the Public
Interest and Academic Freedom, 39 J.C. & U. LAW 405, 466 (2013) (“Though fixing the Garcetti
problem for public employee speech mitigates the harm to academic freedom, it does not address
the fundamental problem that speech in the public arena is very different from academic speech.
Therefore, the Court should exempt academic speech from the public employee speech doctrine
once and for all . . . . In addition, the Court should apply its tradition of deference to the college
or university, not as a corporeal entity, but to the community of scholars, for expression by
faculty within their academic disciplines. To ensure the autonomy granted to college or
universities is not abused, the Court should also grant constitutional protection to the shared
governance activities of faculty.”). See also Bridget R. Nugent & Julee T. Flood, Rescuing
Academic Freedom from Garcetti v. Ceballos: An Evaluation of Current Case Law and A
Proposal for the Protection of Core Academic, Administrative, and Advisory Speech, 40 J.C. & U.
LAW 115, 157–58 (2014) (“Garcetti, if applied to core academic speech, portends an ominous
future for public college and university professorial expression. It is imperative that the Supreme
Court, drawing on its reservation in Garcetti, craft an exception to the public employee speech
doctrine for the speech of academics and address the parameters of such an exception. If it does
not do so, lower courts will increasingly diverge in their application of Garcetti to various types
of academic speech, thus chilling the speech of professors who are unable to guess the framework
that will be applied to the facts of their particular situations. Core academic speech is special;
when professors speak within the realm of academic disciplines, they are pushing inquiry forward
and furthering the public interest. It is the kind of speech the First Amendment is designed to
protect because the role of a professor in teaching or researching is one in which intellect must be
free to safely range and speculate. Academic speech should not be suppressed because of its
content.”).
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The second development is the inconsistency among the circuit courts
in assessing § 1983 public worker employment retaliation claims pursued
by faculty members at public colleges and universities. A review of the
circuit court decisions made after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Garcetti indicates the circuit courts have taken different routes: some have
applied Garcetti without addressing academic freedom; some have
considered whether the faculty member’s speech falls within the realm of
academic freedom and determined it is employee speech not protected by
the First Amendment; and some have determined that Garcetti should not
be applied to faculty member’s speech which falls within the realm of
academic freedom. Hopefully the U.S. Supreme Court will ultimately
resolve this inconsistency.
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